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Illinois Rejects Market Share Liability:
A Policy Based Analysis of
Smith v. Eli Lilly & Co.
By KURT M. ZITZER* AND MARC D. GiNSBERG**
INTRODUCTION
In its long awaited,I thorough and thoughtful Smith v Eli Lilly
& Co.2 opinion, the Illinois Supreme Court rejected the use of
market share liability m pharmaceutical products litigation. The
hallmark of the opinion is the court's unwillingness to cast aside a
traditional principle of tort law-the requirement that a plaintiff
identify the defendant/manufacturer whose product allegedly caused
her injury.3
Defendant identification is at the foundation of tort law, whether
it is characterized formally as causation in fact4 or, much more
* Associate, Rooks, Pitts and Poust, Chicago, Illinois. B.A. 1984, Trinity College; J.D.
cum laude 1990, The John Marshall Law School.
** Partner, Rooks, Pitts and Poust, Chicago, Illinois. B.A. with Honors 1972, University
of Illinois; M.A. 1975, Indiana Umversity; J.D. with Highest Distinction 1977, The John
Marshall Law School.
The authors wish to thank Professor Samuel R. Olken for his helpful comments on
earlier drafts of this article. Of course, the views expressed m tius article are solely those of
the authors and not the law firm of Rooks, Pitts and Poust or its clients.
IThe Illinois Appellate Court ruled in May of 1988. See Smith v. Eli Lilly & Co., 527
N.E.2d 333 (Il. App. Ct. 1988). It was not until more than two years later, m October of
1990, that the Illinois Supreme Court announced its final decision, reversing the appellate
court's holding. See Smith v. Eli Lilly & Co., 560 N.E.2d 324 (111. 1990).
2 560 N.E.2d 324 (111. 1990).
I d. at 345.
4W. KamoN, D. DoaBs, R. KE=N & D. OwEN, PRossER AND KEETON ON TORTS 263
(5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PaossER AND KEEmON].
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colloquially, as the need to know the culprit. As Prosser and Keeton
have commented, "An essential element of the plaintiff's cause of
action for negligence, or for that matter for any other tort, is that
there be some reasonable connection between the act or omission of
the defendant and the damage which the plaintiff has suffered." 5
Seavey has likewise commented that "harm is the tort signature. In
general, the action is based upon the theory that one person has
caused harm to another." 6 Similarly, Cecil A. Wright stated that
one of the purposes of tort law is "to afford compensation for
injuries sustained by one person as the result of the conduct of
another. ' 7 Not surprisingly, the Illinois Supreme Court had also
recognized the causation-in-fact requirement in product liability lit-
igation many years prior to Smith v Eli Lilly & Co."
The primary purpose of this Article is to examine market share
liability m all its variations, 9 and to comment on the Illinois Supreme
Court's rejection of this doctnne, 10 so short-lived in Illinois. Part I
of this Article briefly summarizes market share liability as articulated
by various jurisdictions. Market share liability is based on the policy
of shifting costs of injury from an innocent plaintiff onto several
potentially responsible defendants." Part II establishes that the the-
ory fails to satisfy the underlying policy goals of either a moral or
economic approach to tort law 12 Part III applies the same moral
and economic policy analysis to the Smith decision and concludes
that the Illinois Supreme Court correctly rejected market share lia-
bility 13 Finally, Part IV focuses on a concept touched upon, but
not squarely presented, in Smith-alternative liability m its "classic
sense."'1 4 This part inquires whether courts should apply alternative
liability to relieve a plaintiff of the defendant identification burden
when the plaintiff has joined all potential manufacturers as defen-
dants. 5
SId.
Seavey, Pinciples of Torts, 56 HAxv. L. REv. 72, 73 (1942).
Wright, Introduction to the Law of Torts, 8 CAMRaIa L.J. 238, 238 (1944).
See Schnmdt v. Archer Iron Works, Inc., 256 N.E.2d 6, 7 (Il. 1970), cert. dented,
398 U.S. 959 (1970).
9 See infra notes 16-65 and accompanying text.
10 See infra notes 196-261 and accompanying text.
1 See, e.g., Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 607 P.2d 924, 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 144
(1980) ("[A]s between an innocent plaintiff and negligent defendants, the latter should bear
the cost of the injury."), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).
12 See mnfra notes 70-193 and accompanying text.
,3 See infra notes 196-261 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 262-87 and accompanying text.
11 The reader may observe an example of this question discussed in the Oregon Supreme
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I. MARKET SHARE LALn4211 VARIATIONS
In the early 1980's, the California Supreme Court announced a
unique theory of causation in Sindell v Abbott Laboratories.'6
Sindell was one of the early decisions involving litigation that linked
the drug diethylstilbesterol ("DES") to cancer in the daughters of
women exposed to the drug during pregnancy ,7 The litigants pre-
sented the court with a difficult and complex problem: May a
plaintiff injured by an identifiable drug ingested by her mother
during pregnancy, who cannot identify the manufacturer of the
injury causing product, hold several manufacturers liable based solely
upon the fact that each of the manufacturers produced a similar,
fungible product?' In effect, the plaintiff asked the court to decide
whether she could recover for injuries despite her inability to prove
the element of causation-m-fact.' 9
Judith Sindel brought her action against eleven drug companies
that manufactured the drug DES between the years 1941 and 197 1.20
Court's decision, Senn v. Merrell-Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 751 P.2d 215 (Or. 1988). For a
more complete discussion of the Senn case, see infra notes 276-85 and accompanying text.
1- 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132 (1980).
'7 Some cases involving DES preceded Sindell. See Gray v. United States, 445 F. Supp.
337 (S.D. Tex. 1978) (granting defendant's summary judgment motion due to the plaintiff's
failure to present evidence tending to show that the defendant manufactured the injury causing
drug); McCreery v. Eli Lilly & Co., 150 Cal. Rptr. 730 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978) (affirnung lower
court's decision to grant the defendant's summary judgment motion due to the plaintiff's
inability to sustain a cause of action based on concerted action theory); Abel v. Eli Lilly &
Co., 289 N.W.2d 20 (Mich. 1979), modified, 343 N.W.2d 164 (Mich. 1984) (denying the
defendant's motion to dismiss even though the plaintiff could not identify the specific man-
ufacturer of the injury causing product).
1' Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 607 P.2d 924, 928, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 136 (1980).
19 Id.
2 Id. at 925, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 133. DES is a synthetic compound of the female hormone
estrogen. PHysIciANs' DFsK REFERENCE 1211-12 (44th ed. 1990). In two principal studies,
conducted in the 1940's, researchers concluded that DES was an effective treatment to prevent
miscarriage and premature delivery. Karnakey, The Use of Stilbestrol for Treatment of
Threatened and Habitual Abortion and Premature Labor: A Preliminary Report, 35 S. MED.
J. 838 (1942); Smith, Diethylstilbestrol in the Prevention and Treatment of Complications of
Pregnancy, 56 AM. J. Oasmr -cs & GEacoL oy 821 (1948). Various sources have estimated
that between 100 and 300 companies produced DES between 1941 and 1971. See Gray, 445
F Supp. at 338 (estimating that at least 100 companies produced DES); Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly
& Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069, 1072, 541 N.Y.S.2d 941, 944 (N.Y. 1989) (estimates approximately
300 manufacturers produced the drug), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 110 S. Ct. 350 (1989).
In the early 1970's, the New England Journal of Medicine published two articles linking DES
to vaginal adenocarcmoma and other diseases in the daughters of women who ingested the
drug during pregnancy. Greenwald, Barlow, Nasca & Burnett, Vaginal Cancer After Maternal
Treatment with Synthetic Estrogens, 285 NEw ENo. J. MaD. 390 (Aug. 1971); Herbst, Ulfelder
& Poskanzer, Adenocarcinoma of the Vagina, 284 Naw ENG. J. Man. 878 (Apr. 1971). In
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As a result of her mother's exposure to the drug, Ms. Sindell
developed a malignant bladder tumor which was surgically re-
moved. 2 Each of the plaintiff's causes of action2 alleged that the
defendants were jointly liable because they collectively acted through
express and implied agreements to exploit one another's various
testing and marketing methods.2 The plaintiff could not, however,
identify the specific manufacturer of the product her mother ingested
due, in part, to the fact that DES was essentially a generic or
fungible product.Y
1971, following these reports, the Food and Drug Administration required DES manufacturers
to list pregnancy as a contraindication for their drug, and also required the manufacturers to
include a warning on the product's label indicating that the drug may cause vaginal cancer.
Food and Drug Admin., Diethylstilbestrol Contraindicated in Pregnancy, U.S. Dep't of Health,
Educ. & Welfare Drug Bull. (Nov. 1971).
For a more thorough discussion of the history and development of DES, see Comment,
Market Share Liability: A New Method of Recovery for D.E.S. Litigants, 30 CATH. U.L.
Rv. 551, 554-56 (1981) [hereinafter Comment, Recovery for D.E.S. Litigants]; Comment,
DES and a Proposed Theory of Enterprise Liability, 46 FoRi s L. Rv. 963, 963-67 (1978)
[hereinafter Comment, Enterprise Liability]; Comment, Overcoming the Identification Burden
in DES Litigation: The Market Share Liability Theory, 65 MARQ. L. Rnv. 609, 611-13 (1982)
[hereinafter Comment, Overcoming the Identification Burden].
21 Sindell, 607 P.2d at 926, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 134. Instead of developing vaginal cancer,
Ms. Sindell, as in the majority of cases, developed a less severe injury called adenosis. Id.
Adenosis is a benign but irregular and abnormal placement of tissue on the cervix of the
vagina. Herbst, Ulfelder & Poskanzer, supra note 20, at 880; Comment, Enterprise Liability,
supra note 20, at 965 n.10.
- Ms. Sindell's complaint, in addition to alleging joint liability of all manufacturers
under alternative liability, concert of action and enterprise liability, also alleged other causes
of action, premised upon theones of strict liability, breach of express and implied warranties,
false and fraudulent misrepresentations, misbranding of drugs, civil conspiracy and lack of
consent. Sindell, 607 P.2d at 926, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 134.
23 The Sindell court provided an analysis of the plaintiff's claim that the defendants
should be held jointly liable under theories of alternative liability, id. at 928-31, 163 Cal. Rptr.
at 136-39, concert of action, id. at 931-33, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 139-41, and enterprise liability.
Id. at 933-35, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 141-43.
24 Id. at 926, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 134. Fungible is defined as "of such a kind or nature
that one specimen or part may be used in place of another specimen or equal part in the
satisfaction of an obligation: interchangeable. " W mas 's NrT NEw Coua omA
DICTIONARY 499 (9th ed. 1983). Several decisions have discussed whether a particular product
is fungible for purposes of market share liability. In Shackil v. Lederle Laboratories, 561 A.2d
511 (N.J. 1989), the New Jersey Supreme Court considered whether the drug Dipthena-
Pertussis-Tetanus ("DPT") is a fungible product. In Shackil, a child and her parents filed an
action against numerous manufacturers of DPT seeking recovery under a market share liability
theory. The court provided a detailed discussion of how DPT is prepared and noted that
manufacturers may produce the product in three separate manners. Id. at 521. In America,
however, manufacturers use only two methods, a whole-cell and split-cell vaccine. Id. The
court found that manufacturers could produce the product in different forms and, therefore,
the product was not fungible even though it contained very similar biological formulas. Id. at
[VoL. 79
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Until the Sindell decision, courts routinely dismissed actions
involving fungible products when the plaintiff was unable to identify
the manufacturer of the injury causing product.Y The Sindell court,
however, following the rationale outlined in a Fordham Law Review
article, 26 dramatically altered the face of tort law by adopting the
theory of market share liability. In short, the court's decision ab-
rogated the requirement that a plaintiff prove that a defendant's
conduct was the cause-m-fact of the plaintiff's injury Instead, the
plaintiff need only prove that she has joined a substantial percentage
of those manufacturers engaged in manufacturing the product during
the time of the plaintiff's injury.27 Each manufacturer is then held
liable for a portion of the judgment based on the defendant's share
of the product market3 s To escape liability, a defendant must es-
tablish that it did not produce the product that caused the plaintiff's
injury.29
The Sindell court's discussion of market share liability raised
more questions than it answered: 0 What is a substantial percentage
521-22.
In asbestos products litigation, plaintiffs have attempted to argue that asbestos is a
fungible product for purposes of market share liability. In Goldman v. Johns-Manville Sales
Corp., 514 N.E.2d 691 (Ohio 1987), the court compared the Sindell rationale for market share
liability in DES cases with the theory's application in asbestos products litigation. The court
found that asbestos was not fungible. Id. at 700. Several factors affected the court's deter-
mnation: asbestos is not a product but a generic name for a family of minerals, asbestos is
contained m from 2000 to 3000 different product forms, and in the specific product involved
in the Goldman case, manufacturers used different amounts of asbestos in their similar
products. Id. at 700-01; see also Kinnett v. Massachusetts Gas & Elec. Supply Co., 716 F
Supp. 695, 699-701 (D.N.H. 1989) (holding that the evidence indicated that different brands
of heat tape were not generic or fungible where the accident was in no way attributable to
similar nature of products); Marshall v. Celotek Corp., 651 F Supp. 389, 392 (E.D. Mich.
1987) (holding asbestos not a fungible product); Mullen v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 246
Cal. Rptr. 32, 35-37 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) (same); Case v. Fibreboard Corp., 743 P.2d 1062,
1065-66 (Okla. 1987) (same).
25 See Gray, 445 F Supp. at 337; Abel, 289 N.W.2d at 20.
26 Comment, Enterprise Liability, supra note 20.
" Sindell, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145. One of the criticisms courts and
commentators have directed against the Sindell decision is the court's failure to define what
constitutes a "substantial share" of the product market. See Martin v. Abbott Laboratories,
689 P.2d 368, 381 (Wash. 1984) (rejecting the Sindell version of market share liability due, in
part, to the Sindell court's failure to define "substantial share"); Fischer, Products Liability-
An Analysis of Market Share Liability, 34 VAND. L. REv. 1623, 1639 (1981) (criticizing Sindell
for its failure to define "substantial share" of product market). On this point, the student
comment that the Sindell court's analysis relied upon suggested that a plaintiff must join at
least 75 to 80 percent of the market in order to satisfy the "substantial share" requirement
of market share liability. See Comment, Enterprise Liability, supra note 20, at 996.
2 Sindell, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145.
29 Id.
30 Only eight years after Sindell, the Califorma Supreme Court was forced to clarify its
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of the product market? How should courts calculate the market
share-according to the national, regional or local market? Does
the plaintiff or each individual manufacturer have the burden of
establishing a defendant's market share? What effect may joint and
several liability have on the apportionment of damages under a
market share theory9
The Washington Supreme Court's decision in Martin v. Abbott
Laboratories" was one of the first cases to address some of these
unresolved issues. The Martin case also involved DES litigation. The
court faced essentially the same question presented in Sindell: May
a plaintiff recover from the manufacturer of a fungible product
without proving that the specific product manufacturer was the
cause-m-fact of the plaintiff's injury932 Martin also created a theory
of causation solely dependent upon a finding that an individual
defendant participated in the manufacture and sale of the injury
causing product."3 However, the Martin court rejected much of the
Sindell court's discussion of market share liability 4
earlier decision. In Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470, 245 Cal. Rptr. 412 (Cal. 1988),
the court resolved two issues that arose after Sindell. First, the court held that market share
liability applied only to strict liability products litigation, not to fraud or breach of warranty
theories. Id. at 483-84, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 426. Second, the court explained that market share
liability gives rise only to several liability, instead of joint liability among all defendants. Id.
at 485-87, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 426-27.
Although no court, to date, has addressed this concern, an analysis of market share
liability leads one to question what effect the theory will have on the issue of a plaintiff's
comparative fault. For example, market share liability utilizes a statistical probability that a
defendant caused the plaintiff's injury, based on the defendant's market share. On the other
hand, comparative fault reduces a plaintiff's recovery in whole or in part based upon the
defendant's showing that the plaintiff was in some manner at fault for her own injury. See,
e.g., ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, para. 21-1116 (1987) (Illinois adopted a modified contributory
fault standard). For a more complete discussion of comparative fault application in the
products liability context, see Comment, Modified Contributory Fault and Strict Products
Liability: llinois' Silent Disposal of Misuse and Assumption of Risk Turns Back the Evolution,
23 J. MA~msAi L. REv. 247 (1990).
How will courts resolve the tension between market share liability's presumption that a
defendant is the cause of the plaintiff's injury in proportion to the defendant's market share,
and a finding that the plaintiff caused part or all of her own injury? Most likely, some courts
will undertake a complex and confusing arithmetical analysis to answer questions concerning
respective causation and liability. See Collins v. Eli Lilly & Co., 342 N.W.2d 37, 48-51 (Wis.
1984) (court applied several factors to determine relative comparative fault among several
defendants in market share context), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 826 (1984). Other courts may find
that market share liability is unworkable because it creates evidentiary problems regarding
causation that are too complex for a jury to resolve. See Smith v. Eli Lilly & Co., 560 N.E.2d
324, 344-45 (Ill. 1990) (court rejected market share liability due, in part, to finding that the
theory presents unresolvable evidentiary problems).
3- 689 P.2d 368 (Wash. 1984).
Id. at 371.
Id. at 382.
3" The Martin court rejected Sindell's requrement that a plaintiff must join a substantial
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In fasluomng its theory, identified as "Market-Share Alternative
Liability, ' 35 the court set out to do away with some of the uncer-
tainty it found in the Sindell holding. The Martin court criticized
Sindell on two primary grounds: the court's failure to define what
constitutes a substantial share of the market, and the distortion in
apportionment of damages that results from requiring an incomplete
segment of the business market to bear the responsibility for one
hundred percent of the plaintiff's damages.3 6 As a result, the Martin
court derived its own theory that allowed the plaintiff to commence
suit against only one manufacturer. 7 To recover, the plaintiff must
show that the defendant manufactured the types of product that
caused her injuries, and that the manufacturing of the product was
a breach of the defendant's duty of care.3 9 A defendant still may
escape liability by proving that it did not produce the type of injury
causing product. A manufacturer also may avoid liability by estab-
lisung that it neither marketed the product during the time of the
plaintiff's injury nor marketed the product in the plaintiff's geo-
graphic region.40
The Martin approach treats those defendants unable to exculpate
themselves as equal members of the plaintiffs market.4' Conse-
quently, each defendant shares equally in the satisfaction of any
34 The Martin court rejected SindeI's requirement that a plaintiff must join a substantial
share of the product market. See infra notes 35-39 and accompanying text. In addition, the
decision permitted the defendant to present more evidence in order to avoid liability under
the market share theory. See infra notes 40-45 and accompanying text.
35 Martin, 689 P.2d at 381.
mId. The court asked the reader to assume that the plaintiff's damages totalled $100,000.
The plaintiff joins as defendants 60 percent of the market. Defendant X produces 20 percent
of the total market, but in this case, 33 percent of the substantial market share the plaintiff
has joined as defendants. Hence, while defendant X may produce only 20 percent of the
actual market, under market share liability the defendant represents 33 percent of a substantial
market share the plaintiff has joined. Instead of the defendant paying $20,000 of the plaintiff's
damages, under Sindell the defendant must pay $33,333 (an increase of $13,333, which has
no relation to the defendant's actual market share). Of course, as the substantial share
requirement is reduced, a defendant's market percentage, and eventual liability for a plaintiff's
injury is increased. Id. For example, if the substantial share requirement is only 40 percent of
the relevant market, then under Sindell defendant X must now pay half ($50,000) of the
plaintiff's entire judgment.
" Id. at 382.
38 A plaintiff need not prove that a defendant produced the precise tablet her mother
ingested. Instead, the plaintiff must show only that the manufacturer produced DES of the
same dosage, color, shape, size, etc., as that taken by her mother. Id.
"Id. The plaintiff need not prove that her mother took DES during the time, or m the
geographic region, in which a particular manufacturer produced DES. Id.
" Id.
4 Id. at 383.
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
judgment. 42 A defendant may rebut this presumption by establishing
its actual market share;43 defendants who cannot do so have their
presumed market shares adjusted to total 100 percent of the product
market." The court went on to illustrate that in those circumstances
where all defendants are able to establish their actual market, the
plaintiff may recover less than the entire judgment awarded. 45 The
court believed that its decision served to balance the competing
interests of plaintiffs and defendants. It noted that eliminating a
plaintiff's burden of proving causation-in-fact is liability-enhancing,
while the court's approach to apportionment of damages is liability-
reducing because a defendant is liable according to its actual market
share.46
Although two available views on market share liability existed,
the New York Court of Appeals chose to reject both and created a
third alternative in the case of Hymowitz v Eli Lilly & Co.47
Hymowitz was factually similar to its predecessors; the case involved
litigation concerning injuries caused by in utero exposure to DES. 4
The issue also was substantially the same: Does the failure to identify
the specific manufacturer of the injury causing product preclude a
plaintiff from recovering for her injuries?49 Although the Hymowttz
court's decision to adopt market share liability also removed the
burden of defendant identification, the New York court's version
of the theory was unique in many respects.
Hymowitz took note of the practical difficulties of defining and
establishing an appropriate market from which to determine the
42 Id.
43 Id.
" Id.
41 Id. To illustrate this point, the court asked the reader to assume that the plaintiff has
a $100,000 judgment and has named 80 percent of the product market. Defendant X establishes
that it represents only 20 percent of the market and defendant Y establishes that it represents
only 60 percent of the market. In this case, defendant X must pay $20,000 and defendant Y
pays $60,000. Hence, 20 percent or $20,000 of the plaintiff's judgment goes unsatisfied because
the entire product market was not joined as defendants. Id.
41 Id. In George v. Parke-Davis, 733 P.2d 507 (Wash. 1987), three years after the Martin
case, the Washington Supreme Court attempted to refine further its market share alternative
liability theory. The court's focus in this case was to answer the question of how other courts
should calculate the relevant market. The court held that if evidence exists that will establish
the relevant market at the specific location the plaintiff's mother purchased DES, then the
local market, as opposed to a national or regional market, should form the basis of the
relevant geographic market. Id. at 512.
4 539 N.E.2d 1069, 541 N.Y.S.2d 941 (N.Y. 1989), cert. denied, - U.S.
110 S. Ct. 350 (1989).
-Id. at 1071, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 943.
,- Id. at 1072-73, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 944-45.
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defendant's market share.- The court recognized that other juris-
dictions had struggled with the question of whether to measure a
product market in local, county, state, or national terms.51 In most
instances, courts have based their determinations on the circum-
stances in each individual case.5 2 Faced with the task of providing
guidance to trial courts in over 800 potential DES cases in New
York, the Hymowitz court decided that the only practical and
workable alternative was to measure market share based on a na-
tional standard.5 3 Consequently, a defendant's liability is not correl-
ative of the likelihood that the defendant caused an injury in a
particular geographic region. 4 Instead, the court looks at the defen-
dant's conduct and determines to what extent the defendant has
exposed the public at large to a risk of injury 55 Hence, each defen-
dant's liability is apportioned according to its total culpability for
marketing DES for use during pregnancy 56 Moreover, liability is
based upon the overall risk each defendant creates, and not upon
the likelihood that the defendant caused injury m an individual
case.57 Thus, the Hymowitz court held that a defendant may not
exculpate itself from liability by establishing that it did not market
the product (1) in the form that caused the plaintiff's injury, (2) at
the time of the plaintiff's injury, or (3) in the plaintiff's geographical
region.58
The court tempered its decision to eradicate what had been until
that time most of the available defenses in a market share liability
context by allowing a defendant to assert that it did not market its
product for the particular use that later resulted in the plaintiff's
injury.5 9 In short, the court held that a manufacturer would not be
liable if it did not produce or sell DES for use during pregnancy 60
The Hymowitz decision, much like the Martin case, also held
joint and several liability between tortfeasors inapplicable under
-, Id. at 1077, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 949.
51 See id. at 1076-77, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 948-49 (citing Brown, 751 P.2d at 470, 245 Cal.
Rptr. at 412); George, 733 P.2d at 507; Martin, 689 P.2d at 368; Collins, 342 N.W.2d at 37.
-See George, 733 P.2d at 513 (noting that deterrmnation of relevant market depends
upon available evidence in each individual case).
Hymowitz, 539 N.E.2d at 1077-78, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 949-50.
Id. at 1078, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 950.
,Id.
5 Id.
"Id.
- Id. See Martin, 689 P.2d at 382 (setting forth available defenses to market share
liability).
" Hymowitz, 539 N.E.2d at 1078, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 950.
0 Id.
1990-91]
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market share liability:6 ' Courts may only find product manufacturers
severally liable. Hence, when not all the manufacturers are before
the court, the available defendants' respective liabilities are not
inflated to account for all of the plaintiff's injury 6 Consequently,
some plaintiffs will not recover 100 percent of their damages because
they have not joined 100 percent of the product market.6
61 Id., see Martin, 689 P.2d at 383 (holding that defendants are severally liable in
accordance with their established market share).
Hymowitz, 539 N.E.2d at 1078, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 950.
63 Id. For commentary favoring the New York court's decision, see Twerski, Market
Share-A Tale of Two Centuries, 55 BRooKLYN L. Rav. 869, 870-75 (1989) (noting Hymowitz
provides a predictable and calculable market, removes exculpatory evidence, allows only several
liability, and relates liability to increased risk of harm rather than actual harm). But see Wilner
& Gayer, Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly: New York Adopts a "National Risk" Doctrine for DES, 25
TORT & INs. L.J. 150, 154-56 (1990) (arguing that the court disregards important element of
causation, holds DES manufacturers who did not do business in New York liable for injuries
the DES product has caused in that state, demes a defendant's ability to present exculpatory
evidence, and will lead to increased litigation).
Several months after Hymowitz was decided, the New York Supreme Court released its
opinion m Enright v. Eli Lilly & Co., 553 N.Y.S.2d 494 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1990), rev'd, 1991
WL 18192 (Feb. 19, 1991) (Westlaw). The granddaughter of a woman who had ingested DES
while pregnant brought an action against several drug manufacturers for birth defect injunes
she allegedly sustained due to her mother's in utero exposure to DES. Id. at 494. The plaintiff's
mother's exposure to DES caused reproductive anatormcal abnormalities and deformities that
prevented the mother from carrying the plaintiff to full term. The plaintiff was born prema-
turely, suffering severe disabilities as a result. Id. The litigants asked the court to determine
whether to apply the Hymowitz version of market share liability to the situation where a
granddaughter sustains injuries from her grandmother's ingestion of DES. Id. at 494-95. In
essence, the court had to determine whether it would hold manufacturers liable for the pre-
conception injury of a plaintiff. Id. Relying on Hymowitz, the court chose to extend market
share liability to granddaughters of DES recipients. Id. at 497.
Judge Weiss's dissent argued that tort law should not permit recovery for pre-conception
injunes. Id. at 499 (Weiss, J., dissenting). He relied primarily on Catherwood v. American
Sterilizer Co., 511 N.Y.S.2d 807 (A.D. 4 Dept. 1987), appeal dismissed, 515 N.E.2d 908, 521
N.Y.S.2d 222 (1987), in holding that public policy dictates the need to limit liability for
mjunes m chemical exposure and ingestion cases. Ennght, 553 N.Y.S.2d at 499. The dissent
also held that the majority's reliance on Hymowitz was misplaced. Hymowitz created a new
version of market share liability but did not open the door to expose defendants to liability
for a plaintiff's pre-conception injury. Id. at 499.
The New York Court of Appeals, in review of the Ennght decision, recently held that
the Supreme Court erred in extending a cause of action for pre-conception injuries. Enright
v. Eli Lilly & Co., 1991 WL 18192 (Feb. 19, 1991) (Westlaw). The court, relying principally
on Albala v. New York, 479 N.E.2d 786, 445 N.Y.S.2d 108 (1981), held that public policy
did not favor a cause of action for pre-conception tort injuries in strict product liability claims,
over a policy of confining liability to only those facts which avoid ascribing liability in an
artificial or arbitrary manner. Id. at 3. In short, the court of appeals favored the certainty of
establishing liability over the plaintiff's right of recovery. While this decision does not focus
on the theory of market share liability, its significance remains apparent as other jurisdictions
may also consider the application of market share liability in the third-generation liability
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Each of these three decisions, and others like them,64 drastically
changed traditional notions of tort law As one might expect, the
advent of market share liability generated substantial commentary 65
context.
For a further discussion of a defendant's increased exposure to liability for DES grand-
daughter injuries, see Sherman, New DES Front, Nat'l L.J., March 12, 1990, at i, col. 1.
In Collins, 342 N.W.2d at 50, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that a plaintiff
need not join a substantial market share in order to sustain a cause of action under market
share liability. Defendants may implead other manufacturers into the case to spread liability.
Id. at 51. Defendants who prove they did not manufacture the injury causing product may
avoid liability. Id. at 52. Finally, a jury will assign liability to defendants in proportion to the
amount of risk each defendant has created for the general public. Id. at 53.
In McCormack v. Abbott Laboratories, 617 F Supp. 1521 (D. Mass. 1985), the plaintiff
sought recovery for injuries resulting from her in utero exposure to DES. The plaintiff and
defendants asked the district court to decide whether the Massachusetts Supreme Court's
decision in Payton v. Abbott Laboratones, 437 N.E.2d 171 (Mass. 1982) precluded liability
under a market share theory. McCormack, 617 F Supp. at 1525. The McCormack court held
that Payton did not preclude the plaintiff's recovery. Id. The court's holding allowed a
plaintiff to sustain a cause of action without identifying the cause-m-fact of her injury. Id. at
1526. Instead, the plaintiff need prove only that her mother ingested injury causing DES, that
the defendant marketed the type of DES her mother took, and that the defendant acted
negligently in producing the product. To escape liability, a defendant must prove that it did
not manufacture the type of DES the plaintiff's mother took, did not market the product in
the relevant geographical region, or did not market the product at the time the plaintiff's
mother ingested the DES. Id. As to apportionment of liability, the court followed the Martin
approach.
One of the most recent decisions involving market share liability is the Florida Supreme
Court's holding in Conley v. Boyle Drug Co., 570 So. 2d 275 (Fla. 1990). In Conley, the
plaintiff was diagnosed with cervical adenosis resulting from her in utero exposure to DES.
Id. at 279. She brought an action against eleven manufacturers of the drug alleging negligence,
strict liability, breach of warranty, and fraud. The Florida Supreme Court was asked to decide
whether Florida recognizes a cause of action for the negligent manufacturing and marketing
of a product if the plaintiff, after a reasonable effort, is unable to establish that a particular
defendant was responsible for the injury. Id. The court answered that question in the affir-
mative and chose to adopt the Washington Supreme Court's version of market share liability
as articulated by Martin. Id. at 283. Consequently, the plaintiff need only join one of the
product manufacturers and allege the following: (1) the plaintiff's mother took DES that
caused the plaintiff's injuries, (2) the defendant produced the type of product plaintiff's
mother ingested, and (3) the defendant's conduct was a breach of a legally recognized duty
to the plaintiff. Id. at 282 (citing Martin, 689 P.2d at 382).
As a slight modification to the Martin version of liability, the Conley court held that the
market share theory was available only to those plaintiffs that, after the exercise of due
diligence, are not able to satisfy the element of causation-m-fact. Conley, 570 So. 2d at 286.
Consequently, due diligence became the first element under the Florida Supreme Court's
version of market share liability. Id. While the addition of the due diligence standard is a
notable attempt to cure the problems that market share liability creates, as this Article shows,
the due diligence requirement is not sufficient to resolve many of the moral and economic
dilemmas presented under the market share theory. For a further discussion of these problems,
see infra notes 70-185 and accompanying text.
,5 For examples of commentators who support the market share theory of liability, see
Miller & Hancock, Perspectives on Market Share Liability: Time for a Reassessment?, 88 W
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It is helpful to take note of the debate surrounding this unique
theory. As other commentators have shown, market share liability
initially seems an equitable and efficient resolution of the competing
interests between innocent plaintiffs and defendants. A closer look
shows that this theory does great violence to the traditional concepts
that form the basis of liability in tort.
II. THE RESPONSE TO MARKET SHARE LIABILIT
"[The central policy issue in tort law is whether the principal
criterion of liability is to be based on individual fault or on a wide
distribution of risk and loss." 66 Twentieth century scholars regularly
debate this tort law dialectic. In its most rudimentary terms, the
conflict is one between "moralists" and "econonists." 67 Moralists
emphasize principles of equity and justice as the bases of fault and
liability in tort.6" Economists promote econonuc efficiency as the
proper basis for tort liability 69 Without discussing the relative merits
VA. L. REv. 81 (1985); Robinson, Multiple Causation in Tort Law: Reflections on the DES
Cases, 68 VA. L. REv. 713 (1982); Spitz, From Res Ipsa Loquiter to Diethylstilbestrol: The
Unidentifiable Tortfeasor in California, 65 IND. L.J. 591 (1990); Twerski, supra note 63;
Comment, Recovery for D.E.S. Litigants, supra note 20; Comment, Enterprise Liability, supra
note 20; Comment, Overcoming the Identification Burden, supra note 20; Comment, The
DES Causation Conundrum: A Functional Analysis, 32 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REv. 939 (1987)
[hereinafter Comment, Causation Conundrum]; Comment, The DES Manufacturer Identifi-
cation Problem: A Florida Public Policy Approach, 40 U. MAM L. REV. 857 (1986). But see
Cochran, Plaintiff's Creative Approaches to Prove Who or What Caused Injury, 57 DEF.
CouNs. J. 452 (1990); Fischer, supra note 27; Wilner & Gayer, supra note 63; Comment,
Market Share Liability for Defective Products: An Il-Advised Remedy for the Problem of
Identification, 76 Nw. U.L. Rav. 300 (1981) [hereinafter Comment, An Il-Advised Remedy];
Comment, Market Share Liability: A Plea for Legislative Alternatives, 1982 U. Ia. L. Rnv.
1003 [hereinafter Comment, Legislative Alternatives]; Comment, The Application of a Due
Diligence Requirement to Market Share Theory in DES Litigation, 19 U. MICH. J.L. RE.
771 (1986) [hereinafter Comment, Due Diligence Requirement].
"Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALkE L.J.
499, 499 (1961) (citing C. GREGoRY & H. KALVFP, CASs ON ToRTS 689 (1959)).
17 S. Herwin, Dialects and Dominance: A Study of Rhetorical Fields in the Law of
Confessions, 136 U. PA. L. REv. 729, 743-44 (1988); Comment, An ill-Advised Remedy, supra
note 65, at 314.
" Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEaoL STUD. 151, 151 (1973). For purposes
of this article the authors will utilize the theones of Cicero, Immanuel Kant, John Locke,
Dean Roscoe Pound, H.L.A. Hart, and Tony Honor6 to develop the traditional moralist view
of tort law.
R. PosNR, ECONobIc ANALYsIs OF LAw 6 (1972). Along with Judge Posner, the
major proponents of the economic and law movement are Dean Guido Calabresi and R.H.
Coase. See G. CA.maEzs, T)H COSTS OF Accmms (1970); Calabresi, supra note 66; Coase,
The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & EcoN. 1 (1960). To the extent this Article discusses the
economic theory of tort law, the authors focus primarily on the theories of Guido Calabresi.
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of either position, this Article argues that under either approach,
market share liability fails to satisfy the underlying policy goals.
A. The Moralist Position
Moralists contend that law should reflect society's notions of
equity and justice. Accordingly, liability in tort presupposes the
concept of moral blame. 70 Simply stated, for a jury to find a
defendant liable, justice and equity require a showing that the de-
fendant's actions violated accepted societal standards of conduct.7'
At first glance, market share liability seems to satisfy moral
objectives. In fact, and as some courts and commentators have
noted, as between an innocent plaintiff and a potentially culpable
defendant, a moralist position requires courts to impose liability on
the defendant.7 Justice requires that when balancing the interest of
an innocent plaintiff against the interest of a blameworthy defen-
dant, tort law serves moral objectives by finding the defendant liable.
While there is a certain appeal to this argument, it is fatally flawed
because the analysis fails to take note of one of the fundamental
policy goals of the moralist theory
Market share liability abrogates the requirement that liability
attach only when the defendant's actions are the cause-m-fact of the
plaintiffs injury Causation in tort law is bifurcated into two distinct
70 H. HART & T. HoNolu, CAUSATION n. THE LAw 63 (2d ed. 1985). As Dean Pound
also noted, "[l]iability could flow only from culpable conduct or from assumed duties" and,
"'[e]very act of man which causes damage to another obliges hum through whose fault it
happened to make reparation.' In other words, liability is to be based on an act, and it must
be a culpable act." R. Poui , AN INToDucTION TO THE PEIOsoPHY oF LAW 79, 81 (rev.
ed. 1954) (citing the French Civil Code's theory of delictal liability). See Zwier, "Cause in
Fact" in Tort Law-A Philosophical and Historical Examination, 31 DE PAuL L. Rnv 769,
773 (1982) (analysis of fault focuses on blameworthiness, while analysis of causation focuses
on identification of responsible party).
71 Fischer, supra-note 27, at 1629-30.
7 See, e.g., Sindell v. Abbott Laboratones, 607 P.2d 924, 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 144
(1980) ("[Als between an innocent plaintiff and negligent defendants, the latter should bear
the cost of the injury."), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980); Comment, Enterprise Liability,
supra note 20, at 995-96 (same). But see Robinson, supra note 65, at 735 ("Even if, as some
torts scholars have supposed, the law favors compensation of accident victims, it does not
follow that it also favors liability. Absent some reason to believe that a particular defendant
caused the plaintiff's injury, or that because of his relationship to the plaintiff, he should
bear the plaintiff's loss, it would be a strange legal rule that as a matter of policy favored
holding a defendant liable and so presumed him responsible.") (emphasis in original). It is
precisely a policy reason, however, that has led courts to adopt market share liability.
1990-91]
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concepts. Causation-m-fact is a question for the trier of fact. 73
Proxmate causation, on the other hand, traditionally is a policy
question that limits liability to those circumstances where the defen-
dant's conduct has a sufficient nexus to the plaintiff's injury 74
Market share liability removes the cause-m-fact element and replaces
it with a concept this Article shall describe as "probable causation."
The authors utilize the term to describe the purely statistical prob-
ability that a particular defendant did in fact cause the plaintiff's
injury The reader should not understand the term to mean that a
defendant more probably than not caused the plaintiff's injury, or
that it was foreseeable that the defendant's actions would cause the
plaintiffs injury.
Market share theory no longer requires the plaintiff to prove an
essential question of fact-whether the defendant did in fact cause
the plaintiffs injury Instead, courts applying market share liability
have held that if a defendant markets a fungible product that causes
injury, the court will find that the product is a probable cause of
that mjury75 in proportion to the defendant's market share. Courts
have taken this approach in an attempt to allow plaintiffs to recover
when they cannot factually identify the injury causing party.
The criticism of probable causation as a replacement to causa-
tion-m-fact lies at the very essence of the moralist approach to tort
law Under this theory, principles of "corrective justice' '76 seek to
Firak, The Developing Policy Characteristics of Cause-in-Fact: Alternative Forms of
Liability, Epidemiological Proof and Trans-Scientific Issues, 63 TMa. L. Rav. 311, 312 (1990)
(citing Malone, Ruminations on Cause-m-Fact, 9 STA. L. REv. 60, 60 (1956)). But see Wright,
Causation in Tort Law, 73 CALm. L. REv. 1737, 1823 (1985) (arguing that policy also influences
determinations regarding cause-m-fact).
74 See Firak, supra note 73, at 311.
" See, e.g., Martin v. Abbott Laboratories, 689 P.2d 368, 383 (Wash. 1984) (where
defendant can establish actual market share, market share theory holds the defendant severally
liable in proportion to the defendant's market share).
76 Richard Wright provides a concise definition of corrective justice. As Professor Wright
notes, the theory is premised on the right of individuals to freely pursue life plans or goals.
Wright, Allocating Liability Among Multiple Responsible Causes: A Principled Defense of
Joint and Several Liability for Actual Harm and Risk Exposure, 21 U.C. DAvis L. Ray. 1141,
1180 (1988). The traditional corrective justice theory assumes compensation for only those
plaintiffs who establish that they were injured by the tortious conduct of another. Compen-
sation is rendered to discourage individuals from exposing others to an unreasonable and
foreseeable risk of injury. Id. at 1179.
Some scholars suggest that this premise is derived from the works of Immanuel Kant.
See Weinrib, Causation and Wrongdoing, 63 Cm. [] KENT L. Py. 407, 449 (1987) [hereinafter
Wemrib 1]. Societal order should not be maintained absent a respect for individual rights and
freedoms, measured against the rights and freedoms of others. I. KANT, Tim MTAinr sicAL
EaL&rrs oF JUSTICE 34 (1965). As Professor Weinrib notes, "Kant's legal philosophy was
[VOL. 79
1990-91] MARKET SAREI LIABiLrry
compensate only those plaintiffs who can show that a particular
tortfeasor caused their injury." An example illustrates this point.
While on her way home from work Penny is injured in an
automobile accident when another driver fails to stop at a red light,
enters the intersection, and hits Penny's car. Penny is, by no fault
thus an exploration of the intelligibility of doing and suffering as between free and equal
moral persons." Weinrib I, supra, at 449. It is the concept of conduct and harm, or doing
and suffering, that balances the interests of all individuals' rights to both personal autonomy
and freedom from harm. Cf. Wemrib, Law as a Kantian Idea of Reason, 87 COLUM. L. Ry.
472, 479-80 (1987). For traditional corrective justice theonsts, causation-in-fact is the scale on
which individual rights are balanced, and a necessary part of any liability equation.
In Professor Schroeder's recent articles, he presents a public law view of corrective justice
that draws many of the same conclusions previously outlined by Jules Coleman m his numerous
writings on the subject of retributive justice. See Schroeder, Corrective Justice and Liability
for Increasing Risks, 37 UCLA L. Rnv. 439 (1990) [hereinafter Schroeder I]; Schroeder,
Corrective Justice, Liability for Risks, and Tort Law, 38 UCLA L. REv. 143 (1990) [hereinafter
Schroeder II]. For a discussion of Coleman's views on corrective justice, see J. MuuSHY & J.
CoLamAN, TiE PHmLOsOPHY oF LAw: AN INTRODUCTION TO JuUisPRUDENCE 167-89 (1984);
Coleman, Corrective Justice and Wrongful Gain, II J. LEGAL STUD. 421 (1982). In short,
Professor Schroeder contends that liability for nsk-creation is compatible with the underlying
prermse of corrective justice. Schroeder II, supra, at 143. He explains that a Kantian framework
compels an ex ante or "before the fact" view of tort liability. Schroeder I, supra, at 452-53.
Responsibility for an actor's wrongful conduct is measured at the time of action, rather than
ex post or "after the fact," the time at which the conduct causes injury. Id. at 451-60.
Schroeder postulates a world view in which one bears responsibility and, therefore, pays
compensation to a fund akin to private insurance, based solely upon the decision to engage
in risk-increasing behavior. See id. at 468 ("A system that imposes liability for choices can be
a system to provide compensation for the consequences of actions. The difference is that it
requires compensation from all participants in a class of actions, rather than only those whose
actions fortuitously cause ultimate harm."). Such a system, the author notes, maximizes the
role of predictability in matters of individual accountability for tortious actions. Id. at 459,
464-66. One might question, however, how the removal of causation makes predicting liability
more certain, unless one is to say that liability for creating risks is more predictable because
liability is more certain. Cf. Simons, Corrective Justice and Liability for Risk-Creation: A
Comment, 38 UCLA L. REv. 113, 118 (1990).
Schroeder defends his ex ante view of corrective justice in tort law by suggesting that
the bipolar relationship in litigation must be rejected. Schroeder I, supra, at 470-71. A public
law theory provides an acceptable vehicle for ex ante corrective justice because coliective
responsibility replaces the emphasis tort law places on individual accountability. Id. at 472.
Hence, there exists no need to protect individual autonomy. Id.
Schroeder's view has lead at least one scholar to question whether his ex ante approach
is in fact a theory of corrective justice. Simons, supra, at 121. Simons notes that an ex ante
view imposes a tort fine on an individual that does not represent the defendant's culpability
for actual harm. Instead, "[t]he fine simply reflects the [future] harm expected to result from
the defendant's conduct." Id. The dispute regarding whether liability for nsk-creation is
consistent with corrective justice principles is not one that is resolved, as Simon freely notes.
Id. at 125-29. What one must admit, however, is that in the present context, litigation is
bipolar and an ex ante theory that imposes liability for nsk-creation, without an internal
financing system as Schroeder postulates, does so without regard to personal culpability and
an individual's right of autonomy.
" See supra note 76.
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of her own, unable to identify the driver of the car, who caused
her injuries. Nevertheless, Penny brings an action against Delta
Motors seeking to impose liability on Delta because it carelessly
manufactures cars prone to steering mechanism failures. In this
scenario, Penny stands innocent while Delta is culpable of at least
some "blameworthy" conduct-manufacturing defective cars. Yet it
is obviously apparent that our system of tort law does not permit
Penny to recover from Delta unless Penny can prove that Delta's
blameworthy conduct was in some manner causally related to Pen-
ny's injury In short, and as one commentator has explained, cor-
rective justice presupposes "our asking not only 'Why can this
plaintiff recover from this defendant?' but also 'Why can this plain-
tiff recover from this defendant?" '' 78
Most courts discussing causation-in-fact in the market share
liability context view causation as serving only to answer why the
law should find a particular defendant liable for the injury of a
plaintiff. Essentially, these courts view cause-in-fact as the basis for
identifying the proper and responsible defendant .79 As these courts
reason, equity dictates that the defendant's conduct should not
prevent the plaintiff from recovery 0 because the plaintiff's inability
to identify the injury causing party is likely attributable to the
defendant's conduct.8' Consequently, courts have determined that
justice requires a relaxation of the plaintiff's burden of identifying
a particular defendant as the cause-in-fact of the plaintiff's injury 2
The counterpart of the causation analysis, however, should also
serve to answer the question of why a particular plaintiff may invoke
the principles of equity and justice as grounds for imposing liability
As the illustration above shows, equity and justice also require that
the plaintiff stand in some umque and identifiable position to the
defendant's conduct that permits her, as opposed to the rest of the
u Weinrib I, supra note 76, at 414.
7 See, e.g., Sindell, 607 P.2d at 928, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 136 (beginning with the
proposition that the plaintiff bears the burden of defendant identification).
See Martin, 689 P.2d at 381 (noting that plaintiff's inability to identify defendant was
due to the generic nature of product, the large number of drug manufacturers, the failure of
manufacturers to keep records, and the passage of time between production of the drug and
the plaintiff's injury).
1, Id., see Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069, 1075, 541 N.Y.S.2d 941, 947
(N.Y. 1989) ("mhe ever-evolving dictates of justice and fairness, which are the heart of our
common-law system, require formation of a remedy for injuries caused by DES. "), cert.
denied, - U.S. - , 110 S. Ct. 350 (1989).
Sindell, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145.
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world, to shift the cost of her injury onto the defendant.83 In essence,
causation-m-fact also serves to identify the proper plaintiff to be
compensated for a defendant's blameworthy conduct.84 Simply be-
cause a party has acted carelessly does not mean that any individual
with an injury-not causally related to the negligent conduct-may
seek redress against the careless party. Stated another way, blame-
worthy conduct alone does not subject a party to liability, for
"[s]ome boundary must be set to liability for the consequences of
any act, upon the basis of some social idea of justice or policy ,85
The obvious boundary, and most fundamental policy ideal in the
moralist theory, is that individuals should not have to bear the costs
of injuries they did not in fact cause.
Historically, the moralist position has as one of its primary
objectives the protection of each individual's autonomy or "freedom
of action."s To protect this interest, tort law imposes liability upon
an actor only when his conduct unjustifiably infringes upon the
interests of another s7 Liability in tort should not arise absent proof
that one person's conduct has caused harm to the interests of
another. To allow liability without a showing of causation is to
permit tort law to unduly restrict every individual's liberty 88 Two
primary views, Puritanism and the school of natural law, have
shaped the moralist goal that tort law protect individual autonomy
by restricting liability for one's actions to those circumstances where
the conduct causes an unjustifiable infringement of another's right
to be free from harm.
93 Weinrib I, supra note 76, at 412. Professor Weinrib focuses on the relationship
between causation and wrongdoing and places particular emphasis on the use of causation to
identify the plaintiff properly compensable for a defendant's wrongful conduct. Id. at 414.
" Id.
"PRossER AND KEETON, supra note 4, at 264.
- Roscoe Pound defines "freedom of action" as the right to be free from liability for
one's actions unless those actions mfnnge upon the rights of another. R. POUND, THE SP=rr
OF THE COMMON LAw 143 (1921).
- Prosser and Keeton likewise view freedom of action in terms of individual autonomy
balanced against an individual's right to be free from harm. PRossER AND KEETON, supra note
4, at 6.
- See R. PoUND, supra note 86, at 143. Pound characterizes liberty as dictating that
persons shall be free to act in the manner they choose, unless their conduct violates accepted
societal standards of conduct and infringes upon and in fact causes harm to the interest of
another person. Id. He emphasizes that personal freedom is at the foundation of all law
including modem property and contract laws that secure the right to freely acquire property
interests and permit persons to enter into voluntary agreements to exact performance from
one another in exchange for mutual promises. Id. at 143-45.
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1. Puritanism and the Moralist Policy
In Anglo-American history, the Puritans have assumed an im-
portant role in shaping the law Due in part to persecution by the
English authorities, the Puritans' theological and philosophical views
held that the protection of individual freedoms was the primary
purpose of the law 89 Rebuffing the majority's efforts to conform
the Puritans to traditional English societal beliefs, the Puritans
developed a view of the law that sought to protect the individual's
freedom. 90 This view encompassed a person's right to speak, think
and act unrestricted by totalitarian influences. Government should
not impose social order by subjecting the actions of unwilling men
to restrictive rules of law, but by encouraging men to freely consent
to live according to accepted standards governed by a societal con-
tract.91 As several commentators have noted, the Puritans' strong
spirit of individualism dictated that all persons closely monitor the
effect of laws addressing individual freedomY2 Essential to the goal
of limiting the law's potential for oppressive restriction on individual
liberty was the requirement that government utilize the force of law
to restrict an individual's conduct only when the conduct infringed
" Zwier, supra note 70, at 785.
10 Id. At the heart of Puritanism was the attempt to create a "new order" that was
premised upon the belief that each person knew and carried the laws of God in his mind and
heart. Id. at 785 n.93. Accordingly, individuals collectively covenant with one another to live
out their lives in accordance with the law of God. Id. at n.92. Law, therefore, was the
voluntary undertaking of each person to conform to God's principles for correct behavior.
Id. at 785. It was based on consent and not the power of several authorities to require
individuals to conform to certain rules. The supremacy of each individual's will and freedom
of action was the basis for the Puritans' philosophy of law. Id. As Pound notes, "[a]
fundamental proposition from which the Puritan proceeded was the doctrine of a 'willing
covenant of conscious faith, made by the individual."' R. POUND, supra note 86, at 42. The
resulting theories created an order that sought to secure and protect individual autonomy. Id.,
see Zwier, supra note 70, at 785-86.
9, Dean Pound analogizes the Puritan's view of law to that of contract theory. Because
each individual is free to act in accordance with her conscience and to covenant with others
to accept and abide by a social standard for behavior, all law must also find its legitimacy in
the social contract of those persons who agree to be bound by the law. R. PoUND, supra note
86, at 43. The Puritan view is similar to the view expressed by John Locke in his treatise on
government. At the center of Locke's theory was the premise that government exists, continues,
and is legitimate because each individual willingly submits his autonomy to the will of the
majority in the form of a social contract. J. LOCKE, Tan SECoND TREATISE OF GovEatmNrr
54-55 (1952). Locke noted that the only way persons may properly divest themselves of their
natural liberty is "to agree to join or unite into a community for their comfortable, safe, and
peaceable living one amoungst another. " Id. at 55; see also J. RoussEAu, ON THE SOCIAL
CONTRACT 23-26 (1983) (Rousseau also notes that government and its laws find their basis in
individuals that willingly consent to contract with one another to forgo individual freedom
and accept a social standard that governs and restricts each person's actions.).
92 See Zwier, supra note 70, at 785-88.
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upon the rights of another person. 9 In effect, this view provided a
system of checks and balances to guard against antisocial behavior
while maintaimng respect for personal autonomy Absent such bal-
ancing established by requiring a causal connection, any restriction
on an individual's freedom is unwarranted and inconsistent with the
Puritans' philosophy of law
2. Natural Law and the Moralist Policy
Closely related to the Puritan theory of legal philosophy was
the school of natural law. At the core of the natural law theorist's
perspective was the belief that reason was superior to any other
virtue because it instructed men m morality and led to the knowledge
of God.Y Reason also dictated that all persons possess "natural
rights" to be free from the arbitrary and inflexible exercise of
power.95 Historically, scholars have discussed the natural rights of
liberty and freedom in terms of "individualism."
The concept of individualism or "personal security" is bifur-
cated. First, natural law philosophers posit that the law must secure
and protect individual rights from intrusion by others. 96 The coun-
"See 4 R. PouND, JuRIsPRUDENCE 508-15 (1959) (arguing that the purpose of causation
is to create satisfactory balance between the social interest in general security and the individual
interest in freedom of action).
"See 0. GmIKE, NATURAL LAW AND THE THEORY OF SOCIETY 1500 TO 1800, at 36
(1958) (citing F SuAREz, TRACTATUS DE LEGMUs AC DEo LEGISLATORE (1611)); H. CAreSs,
LEGAL PmsoPHY FRoM PLATO TO HEoEL 175-84 (1949) (discussing the scholastic St. Thomas
Aquinas and his theory of natural law). Secular moral philosophers also developed theories
of natural law, premised on reason, which expressed principles of natural rights similar to
those articulated by Christian theologians. According to Hugo Grotius, a natural right is that
moral quality which bestows upon a person freedom and liberty to act unrestricted by another
individual or government. 4 R. Poum, supra note 93, at 63 (citing GRoTis, DE Wun aEM AC
PACIS (1625)). In either case, both groups accepted'that reason leads to the belief that all
persons have certain fundamental and natural rights that protect individual liberty.
An example of such a theory is observed in the writings of Cicero. Cicero conceptualized
law in three distinct classifications. First and foremost was the heavenly law, or lex caelestis,
which is not a product of human reason, but an external force that governs the whole universe.
H. CA Ns, supra, at 135. Cicero defined natural law, or lex naturae, as the perfect reason of
wise men and the resulting rules that reason discovers that permit nations to govern their
citizens and allow persons to achieve the highest good, the enjoyment of life. Id. at 140-41.
Finally, Cicero viewed positive law, or lex vulgas, as rules the State creates that bond civil
society and either command or prohibit action. Id. at 141-42.
" See R. POUND, supra note 86, at 150 ("[I]ndividual rights and justice as the realization
of individual rights were put above state and society as permanent absolute realities which
state and society existed only to protect.").
9 "In consequence, its [natural law] idea of security includes two elements: everyone is
to be secured in his interests against aggression by others and others are to be permitted to
acquire from him or to exact from him only through his will that they do so or through his
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terpart holds that the law should restrict individual freedom only
when one's conduct unjustifiably violates the personal security of
others.97 As the law attempts to balance a plaintiff's and defendant's
rights to security, the cause-in-fact element becomes an indispensable
factor in the equation. Consequently, for the plaintiff to recover for
a violation of her right to be free from harm, she must identify the
defendant as the person who caused her injury 98 Absent such iden-
tification, the balancing of interests requires that courts protect the
integrity of the defendant's security by refusing to shift the cost of
a plaintiff's injury to a defendant who was not causally responsible. 99
3. Moralism and Market Share Liability
The judicial system, in its acceptance of market share liability,
overemphasizes the goal of protecting the plaintiff's security against
mfnngement. The plaintiff's interest is only one of the rights that
equity and justice must protect.1°° In the market share liability
context, courts have permitted the plaintiff to recover for injuries
without identifying the party who caused the harm. The plaintiff's
right to compensation is thus elevated above several defendants'
rights to freedom of action. Moreover, the plaintiff's right is pro-
tected without a showing that any defendant's conduct infringed
upon the plaintiff's interest to be free from harm. The resulting
effect violates the underlying goal of the moralist position-to up-
hold all individuals' rights to be free from unwarranted restrictions
on their freedom.101
breach of rules devised to secure others in like interest." R. PouND, supra note 86, at 143.
The theory of natural law led Herbert Spencer, a Kantian philosopher, to remark, "[e]very
man is free to do that which he wills provided he infringes not the equal liberty of any other
man." H. CAINs, supra note 94, at 401-02 (citing H. SPmEcER, JusTIcE § 27 (1891)).
R. POUND, supra note 86, at 143.
See Zwier, supra note 70, at 795 (arguing that cause-m-fact is implicit m notion of
responsibility and without proof of causation, liability would violate individual freedom and
social contract).
9 Cf. 5 R. POUND, JURISPRUDENCE 319-24 (1959) (positing that the doctrine of contrib-
utory negligence was prermsed on the theory that he who caused his own injury had no
standing to shift loss to another who was also at fault); Epstein, Two Fallacies in the Law of
Joint Torts, 73 GEo. L.J. 1377, 1378-82 (1985) (criticizing the theory that removes the cause-
in-fact element because such a theory often results in a wholly innocent party bearing liability
for harm it did not cause).
"00 See, e.g., R. POUND, supra note 86, at 143 (asserting that tort law must also secure
individuals' rights to freedom of action).
10, See England, The System Builders: A Critical Appraisal of Modem American Tort
Theory, 9 J. LEoAL STUD. 27, 27 (1980); Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure
Cases: A "Public Law" Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARv. L. Rav. 851, 859-60 (1984).
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Probable causation as the basis for liability in the market share
context also violates the very policy goals of equity and justice that
courts have invoked to justify the theory's existence. Courts utilize
probable causation to elevate one individual's rights to compensation
over several individuals' rights to freedom of action. The law should
not premise the burden of liability, and infringement upon individual
autonomy, on the mere possibility that a defendant caused injury
in proportion to that defendant's share of a product market. With-
out requirng a factual showing that a defendant caused the plain-
tiff's injury, courts frustrate moral objectives when they impose
liability on several individuals who bear no responsibility for the
harm.1 02
Probable causation creates additional problems because it re-
moves the plaintiff's incentive to attempt diligently to identify the
culpable defendant. 13 For example, one plaintiff may try to identify
the injury causing party, and discover that the responsible defendant
is either a very small business or insolvent. This plaintiff is eventually
left without any compensation for her injuries. Another plaintiff,
who relies on the market share theory, and does nothing to establish
who caused her injury, will recover because at least some of the
named defendants will be able to satisfy a judgment. In this scenario,
probable causation brings about the inequitable result of rewarding
the ignorant plaintiff while denying the diligent plaintiff recovery ,04
The Washington Supreme Court, in Martin v Abbott Labora-
tories,, asserted that its decision to adopt probable causation served
to balance the interests of both plaintiffs and defendants by elirm-
nating the plaintiff's burden of establishing causation-in-fact, while
reducing the defendants' liability to only their calculated market
shares. 05 The court based its holding on a desire to shift the costs
of injury to those parties who were in a better position than the
plaintiff to absorb the loss. 1 6 This position is contrary to precedent
because the law has never recognized the defendant's wealth as a
legitimate factor in determining whether a party should bear the
I See Comment, An Ill-Advised Remedy, supra note 65, at 327 (submitting that to hold
the defendant liable for accidents he did not cause and is not responsible for offends the just
and equitable requirement that liability bear some connection to responsibility.).
103 Id. at 328; see Comment, Due Diligence Requirement, supra note 65, at 783 (noting
that a plaintiff has no incentive to identify the tortfeasor under market share theory and,
therefore, urging that courts adopt a due diligence element).
"0 Comment, An Ill-Advised Remedy, supra note 65, at 329.
101 Martin, 689 P.2d at 383.
116 Id. at 382.
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responsibility for a plaintiff's injury ,o7 Courts should consider a
defendant's ability to pay only after the plaintiff has shown that the
defendant's conduct was blameworthy, and that the defendant's
conduct did in fact cause the plaintiff's injury ,o8 Probable causation
produces inequitable results because it uses the defendant's ability
to pay as a basis for liability, regardless of whether the defendant
was causally responsible for the plaintiff's harm.' 9 Not only does
the theory of market share liability fail to satisfy the moralist policy
of protecting individual autonomy, but as we shall see, it also fails
to meet the economists' objectives of promoting efficiency
B. The Economist Position
The "law and economics" movement of the twentieth century" °
seeks to blend principles of economics"' with legal analysis to pro-
duce certain social or policy goals. The primary goal of this legal
philosophy is to promote efficient allocation of individual and social
resources." 2 Scholars discussing tort law have devised several anal-
yses to achieve this goal, such as "risk-distribution,"" 3 "cost-bene-
fit,""14 and "nsk-utility "I" Whatever the mechanics of the analyses
'- See Sindell, 607 P.2d at 941, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 149 (Richardson, J., dissenting) ("A
system priding itself on 'equal justice under law' does not flower when the liability as well as
the damage aspect of a tort action is determined by a defendant's wealth." (emphasis in
original)).
109 Id.
' Comment, An ll-Advised Remedy, supra note 65, at 328.
110 While by no means an exhaustive list, the prominent architects of the "law and
economics" movement are Guido Calabresi, R.H. Coase, and Richard Posner. See supra note
69 for a selection of these authors' works.
"' Richard Posner defines economics as "the science of human choice in a world in
which resources are limited in relation to human wants. It explores and tests the implications
of the assumption that man is a rational maximizer of his ends in life, his satisfactions-what
we shall call his 'self-interest."' R. PosNER, supra note 69, at 1.
2 Posner discusses efficiency in terms of exploiting economic resources so that a con-
sumer's willingness to purchase goods and services is a direct indicator of human satisfaction.
Id. at 4.
113 Dean Calabresi provides an illustration of nisk-distribution. As part of his analysis of
secondary accident cost avoidance, he poses two correlatives concermng the cost of accidents.
First, "taking a large sum of money from one person is more likely to result in economic
dislocation than taking a series of small sums from many people." G. CALADREsI, supra
note 69, at 39 (citing Feezer, Capacity to Bear Loss as a Factor in the Decision of Certain
Types of Tort Cases, 78 U. PA. L. Rnv. 805, 809-10 (1930)). Second, even if the total
economic effect of the loss were the same, "many small losses would be preferable to one
large one simply because people feel less pain if 10,000 of them lose one dollar apiece than if
one person loses $10,000." G. CALA.naSI, supra note 69, at 39. In essence then, risk-
distribution is a concept that seeks to rmmmize the social costs accidents cause by broadly
spreading those costs among the general society. Id., see generally Calabresi, supra note 66.
114 Cost-benefit analysis has its roots in a formula articulated by Judge Learned Hand in
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are, however, the economic legal theorist seeks to benefit societal
United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947). In Carroll, a tugboat lost
control of a barge that struck a tanker, sinking the barge and its cargo of flour. Id. at 170-
71. The barge had no bargee or other attendant on board when the vessel broke its moorings.
Id. The court considered the issue of whether the absence of an attendant should reduce the
plaintiff's recovery for injury to his own vessel. Id. at 173. The Carroll court set forth the
following formula to determine liability: The probability that an accident shall occur is equal
to P The gravity of resulting injury is equal to L. Finally, the burden of taking precautions
to avoid the accident is equal to B. If the burden of avoidance is less than the product of the
probability of an accident multiplied by the severity of mjury, then the court will impose
liability on the responsible party. In arithmetical terms, liability is expressed in the equation
B < PL. Id.
Richard Posner has seized upon the "Learned Hand" formula of cost-benefit analysis,
utilizing a similar formula in his decisions. See, e.g., United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v.
Jadranska Slobodna Plovidba, 683 F.2d 1022, 1026 (7th Cir. 1982). Posner's variation on the
formula is called the economic model of due care. See W L.ANEs & R. PosNER, THE
ECONOMIC STRucTuR OF TORT LAW 58-62 (1987). In order to quantify the probability of loss
versus the burden of avoidance, Posner removes B (the burden of cost prevention) and replaces
it with By (the marginal cost of care). Id. at 87. He also replaces PL (the probability of and
resulting damage from an accident) with -PyD (the marginal reduction in accident damage),
rewriting the Hand Equation as By < -Py D. Id. He summarizes his theory noting that
accident causing conduct is negligent (y*) if the "marginal cost of accident avoidance is less
than the marginal benefit from avoidance." Id. In graphic form the equation is represented
as follows:
-PyD,
By
-PyD
-y* y
Id. at 60 (figure 3.3). For a more detailed discussion of the cost-benefit theory, see White,
Risk-Utility Analysis and the Learned Hand Formula: A Hand that Helps or a Hand that
Hides?, 32 AF=. L. Rzv. 77, 102-06 (1990).
" Risk-utility analysis is an extension of the Learned Hand formula. In short, the
formula imposes liability if the risk of a product outweighs its social usefulness. Note, Strict
Product Liability and the Risk-Utility Test for Design Defect: An Economic Analysis, 84
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goals by deterring inefficient or socially undesirable conduct, 1 6 re-
ducing societal secondary costs for accidents and injuries," 7 and
limiting governmental or administrative costs that result from a
defendant's tortious conduct.""
Courts adopting market share liability have also premised their
decisions on the contention that it is economically efficient." 9 Stated
simply, these courts have found that the theory serves economic
interests because it reduces societal costs by distributing the risk of
a plaintiff's loss among several potentially responsible defendants,
rather than placing the burden solely on the injured party ,20 What
courts have failed to evaluate, however, is the degree to which
market share liability deters undesirable conduct, spreads secondary
costs, or reduces adminstrative costs resulting from tortious con-
duct.'2 ' This Article concludes that although market share liability
promotes some econormc goals, the costs of the theory outweigh its
benefits.
COLuM. L. Rnv. 2045, 2050 (1984) [hereinafter Note, Risk-Utility Test]. Dean Wade also has
a theory of risk-utility. His test imposes liability for a product's design defect if "the magnitude
of the risk created by the dangerous condition of the product [is not] outweighed by the social
utility attained by putting it out m tius fashion." Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability
for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825, 835 (1973) (citing Keeton, Product Liability and the Meaning
of Defect, 5 ST. MARY's L.J. 30, 37 (1973)). The courts utilize various factors m making this
determination: (1) the usefulness of the product, (2) the availability of a feasible alternative
design, (3) the availability of substitutes, and (4) the consumers' ability to guard against a
product's danger. Note, Risk-Utility Test, supra, at 2050-51. The law of supply and demand,
or a consumer's willingness to purchase a product, determines the product's economic utility.
Id. at 2052. Risk is the number of accidents a product will likely cause multiplied by the costs
for those accidents. Id. at 2053. For a graphic depiction of the risk-utility theory, see id. at
2053, 2056-58, 2062-66. There the author graphs the variables in an elementary nsk-utility
analysis, and proceeds to consider the costs for alternative designs, the effect of risk not
known to the consumer, and finally the cost effect of imposing liability for a product where
no feasible alternative design exists. Id.
116 G. CALAaREsI, supra note 69, at 266.
117 Id. at 27-28.
I's Id. at 28.
119 The Martin court articulated this theory:
Moreover, as between the injured plaintiff and the possibly responsible drug
company, the drug company is in a better position to absorb the cost of the
injury. The drug company can either insure itself against liability, absorb the
damage award, or pass the cost along to the consuming public as a cost of
doing business. We conclude that it is better to have drug companies or consum-
ers share the cost of the injury than to place the burden solely on the innocent
plaintiff.
Martin, 689 P.2d at 382.
12 Id.
2I For a discussion of these issues, see infra notes 122-88 and accompanying text.
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1. The Goal of Deterrence
As Professor Calabresi explained in hns seminal treatise The
Costs of Accidents, one of the primary subgoals of an economic
analysis of the law is the deterrence of inefficient conduct. 12 Courts
may achieve this result by either rewarding safer practices to en-
courage those who would engage in such conduct,' 23 or penalizing
dangerous practices to discourage those who would engage in such
conduct. 124 Market share liability does not, however, achieve the
deterrent goals of the economic theory.
First and foremost, market share liability does not create mcen-
tives to promote safer conduct. In fact, pharmaceutical market share
liability may actually discourage manufacturers from creating safer
products and developing new socially beneficial products.'2
Market share liability spreads the cost of a plaintiff's injury onto
the manufacturers of an injury causing product, regardless of whether
a specific manufacturer's product caused the plaintiff's mjury.12 In
the context of inherently fungible products such as DES, a manu-
facturer that attempts to create a safer product will not fully benefit
from its efforts because the market share theory does not consider,
for purposes of liability, the safety efforts of an individual defen-
dant.12 Moreover, if a drug manufacturer is successful in producing
a safer product, which by its inherent nature remains fungible and
otherwise mdistingushable from other manufacturers' products,
market share liability still does not permit the safe manufacturer to
exculpate itself.'2 Although the efforts of the safety minded pro-
'1 See G. CALABRms, supra note 69, at 26.
I" Id. at 73. Calabresi notes that individuals engaged in unsafe practices will alter their
conduct and shift to safer practices if accident costs are reflected in the practices' price. He
goes on to explain that the degree of change depends upon the difference in costs between
the two practices and whether the safe alternative is a good substitute. Id.
m Id. at 73-74.
In See, e.g., Payton v. Abbott Laboratories, 437 N.E.2d 171, 189-91 (Mass. 1982)
(arguing that market share liability discourages pharmaceutical manufacturers from developing
socially beneficial drugs); see also Note, A Question of Competence: The Judicial Role in the
Regulation of Pharmaceuticals, 103 HARv. L. R-v. 773, 784-85 (1990) (contending that
increased liability leads to increased cost for beneficial medications, thereby harming the
general public); Comment, Overcoming the Identification Burden, supra note 20, at 634
(positing that extending liability through market share theory produces "chilling" effect on
research and development of new drugs).
226 See supra notes 16-29 and accompanying text.
" Cf. Spitz, supra note 65, at 632 (pointing out that market share liability does not
consider differences in individual manufacturers' warnings and safety instructions).
In Cf. Martin, 689 P.2d at 383 (noting that safety efforts or efforts to improve drugs
are not considered exculpatory).
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ducer may lessen the total number of injuries resulting from the
product, the cost for all injuries is still spread among the product
market. 29 Irresponsible manufacturers may receive a "free ride" on
the efforts of safer manufacturers.Y3 0 As one commentator has noted,
"[r]elatively safe producers end up subsidizing relatively unsafe
producers."'' There exist insufficient incentives under the market
share theory to encourage drug manufacturers to develop safer
products because a manufacturer does not fully benefit from its
safety efforts, and may in fact subsidize and share equally in judg-
ments with producers of the same product who do not spend the
same resources to improve the safety of their products. 32 Indeed,
there arguably exist economic incentives to ride free on the efforts
of manufacturers who choose to improve the safety of their prod-
ucts.
33
Second, market share liability reduces manufacturer incentives
to spend the time and resources necessary to develop socially bene-
ficial products because of the fear of long term and almost limitless
liability '34 In Payton v Abbott Laboratories,35 several thousand
women who were exposed in utero to DES brought a class action
suit. The plaintiffs asked the Massachusetts Supreme Court to adopt
market share liability and remove the identification requirement
from a plaintiff's negligence action. 3 6 The court imtially noted that
tort law historically requires the plaintiff to identify the injury
causing party in a law suit for negligence. 37 It went on to state that
removing the cause-in-fact requirement would discourage pharma-
,29 Miller & Hancock, supra note 65, at 104.
130 Id. Professors Miller and Hancock note that an individual's attempts to improve
safety produce social gains that are externalized, resulting in "free/nding." When one partic-
ular manufacturer expends time and resources to enhance product safety, it does not receive
the full benefit of its efforts because the benefit is spread among other manufacturers and the
general society. Id. (citing Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. I (1960)).
,31 Comment, An IlI-Advised Remedy, supra note 65, at'317.
132 Miller & Hancock, supra note 65, at 104.
133 See Comment, An III-Advised Remedy, supra note 65, at 320 (noting that free riders
have incentives to make cheap products that are difficult to distinguish from those of safe
manufacturers).
t14 See, e.g., Enright v. Eli Lilly & Co., 553 N.Y.S.2d 494 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1990) (extending
market share liability to pre-conception injuries in DES granddaughters), rev'd, 1991 WL
18192 (Feb. 19, 1991) (Westlaw). Estimates of settlement costs for DES cases currently pending
are as high as $240 million. Freudenheim, Precedent is Seen in DES Decision, N.Y. Times,
Apr. 6, 1989, at 19, col. 2.
" 437 N.E.2d 171 (Mass. 1982).
"' Id. at 188.
' See id. (positing that identification serves two purposes: it separates wrongdoers from
innocent actors, and it ensures that wrongdoers are held liable for only the harm they cause).
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ceutical manufacturers from developing new and socially beneficial
drugs. 38 According to the Payton court, "[p]ublic policy favors the
development and marketing of new and more efficacious drugs.' 1 39
The court reasoned that to hold each drug manufacturer liable not
only for its product, but also for the products of other manufac-
turers, imposes such broad liability as to discourage the development
and marketing of new drugs.'14 Particularizing its analysis to the
DES problem, the court noted that the very cure to the plaintiffs
cancerous disease may lie in the development and manufactunng of
new drugs.' 4'
Expansive liability under the market share theory, although ad-
mittedly penalizing dangerous activities and producing some desira-
ble deterrent effects, fails to meet the economic goal of creating
incentives for safer conduct. Market share liability reduces manu-
facturer incentives to produce safer drugs and to meet society's
tremendous demand for new drugs to prevent and cure illness.' 42
Consequently, the market share theory may work to create an
atmosphere where individuals are exposed to greater risks of harm
and only limited resources are made available to meet society's health
care needs.
2. The Goal of Spreading Societal Secondary Costs
Market share liability is premised on the desire to spread the
costs of an accident from an injured party to several parties engaged
in the enterpnse that caused the loss.' 43 In theory, it is argued that
to expose one person to a large loss is more likely to result in
economic dislocation and increased secondary losses,' 44 than to have
several people bear relatively small parts of the same loss.' 45 In
318 Id. at 189-90.
"3 Id.
,,0 Id. at 189-90 n.17.
'14 Id. at 190 n.18.
" See Comment, Federal Preemption of Prescription Drug Labeling: Antidote for Phar-
maceutical Industry Overdosing on State Court Jury Decisions in Products Liability Cases, 22
J. MARSHALL L. REv. 629, 648 nn.130-31 (1989) (notes statistical data regarding number of
prescnptions written yearly, and the life saving use of the drugs insulin, cholestyramnne, and
nlcotine polacrilex).
"I See, e.g., Martin, 689 P.2d at 382 (stating that defendants can insure against liability,
absorb the costs as part of doing business, or pass the costs along to consumers); Calabresi,
supra note 113, at 505 (same).
- Risk-distribution theory is premised on this argument. As Calabresi notes, the crushing
burden of accident costs placed on one individual may lead to greater and more drastic social
costs. See G. CALaR.sI, supra note 69, at 39; see also supra note 113.
",, G. CA.Anaasi, supra note 69, at 39.
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practice, this concept may mean requiring 1,000 people to pay $1
each instead of requiring one person to pay $1,000 individually 14
Thus, no one person is financially devastated and society is able to
absorb the loss without it seriously affecting the economic climate
because the loss is spread among a greater number of individuals. 14
These authors do not dispute that market share liability succeeds
in spreading the costs of an injury from one individual to several
defendants. In this limited aspect, market share liability meets the
economic goal of spreading societal costs. Even in its success, how-
ever, market share liability creates problems of application since the
theory will most likely cause manufacturers to increase the price of
products unrelated to the accident. 14s
As manufacturers discover that their products create dangerous
conditions, they will remove the products from the stream of com-
merce to avoid further liability 149 Consequently, manufacturers will
not be unable to pass on to consumers the costs of those accidents
the old product caused. The manufacturer will be left with two
choices. The manufacturer may totally absorb the loss and not
spread the costs to the consuming public m the form of higher prices
for the product.Y0 This result is in direct conflict with the economic
goal of spreading costs broadly among numerous parties so that no
one individual is left to bear a severe financial burden."1 The other
alternative is to increase the cost for those safe and nondefective
products that the manufacturer currently markets.5 2 Although this
choice effectively spreads the costs for accidents, it does so in a
manner unrelated to the actual risk of injury caused by the unsafe
products."' In essence, safe products will cost more. Consequently,
although market share liability promotes the spreading of secondary
146 Id.
14 Id.
I" Comment, An IlI-Advised Remedy, supra note 65, at 322.
,49 The Restatement (Second) of Torts states that before a court may find a manufacturer
stnctly liable, the product upon which liability is premised must enter the stream of commerce
through sale. RFsTATEMENT (SEcoND) oF TORTS § 402A (1965).
110 See supra note 143.
M G. CALxAp.rnsi, supra note 69, at 39.
U While this is an alternative, one might ask how, in practical terms, a manufacturer
may raise the pnce of its products and remain competitive with other manufacturers who do
not face the same burdens of absorbing the costs of liability for an older defective product?
Either manufacturers will increase the price for a product that is patented and therefore
umque, or manufacturers will be forced to absorb the loss from the defective product in an
effort to have their current products competitively priced.
,W' Comment, An ll-Advised Remedy, supra note 65, at 322.
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losses, the theory does so without a nexus to the actual market of
an injury causing product.''
Market share liability also fails to spread the loss effectively
among numerous defendants. Under the Martin court's decision, a
plaintiff need join only one manufacturer of the injury causing
product. 55 Under Sindell, a plaintiff need join only a substantial
share of the product market. 56 In most cases then, a plaintiff will
join only a small percentage of the product manufacturers. 157 Ad-
ditionally, various plaintiffs most likely will join the same small
group of defendants that are currently large and solvent compa-
mes. 5 1 Plaintiffs will not join the smaller or nonexistent businesses
that manufactured the product. 159 Consequently, the market share
theory spreads the loss to only a small group of the entire product
market, which is asked to absorb a disproportionate share of the
losses caused by the entire industry.160 This result does not effectively
promote the economc goal of broadly spreading the secondary costs
of accidents to several individuals.' 6'
In conclusion, market share theory does promote a limited
spreading of secondary costs. The theory does not, however, fully
succeed in achieving the economic goal of a broad distribution of
loss. The benefits gained from market share liability are limited and
are outweighed by the theory's inefficiency in deterring undesirable
conduct. Further, as this Article discusses immediately below, the
theory fails to reduce the adminimstrative costs of accidents.
3. The Goal of Reducing Administrative Costs
Market share liability increases administrative costs in two gen-
eral areas. First, the removal of the cause-in-fact element from a
plaintiff's claim encourages a greater number of lawsuits and in-
1' Id.
W See Martin, 689 P.2d at 382.
116See Sindell, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145.
I" For example, while over 300 companies manufacture DES, in the Smith case, the tnal
and appellate courts chose to adopt market share liability although only eight defendants
remained in the case. Smith v. Eli Lilly & Co., 560 N.E.2d 324, 326-27 (1990).
Im In Sindell, Martin, Hymowitz, and Collins, Eli Lilly, Abbott Laboratories, E.R. Squib
& Sons, Upjohn and Rexall Drug Company were all named as defendants. Sindell, 607 P.2d
at 927, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 135; Martin, 689 P.2d at 372; Hymowitz, 539 N.E.2d at 1070-71,
73 N.Y.2d at 494-501; Collins, 342 N.W.2d at 41.
I" In Smith, the plaintiff joined only 138 of the possible 300 DES manufacturers as
defendants. Smith, 560 N.E.2d at 326.
16 Comment, An II-Advised Remedy, supra note 65, at 322 n.124.
61 See. G. CALABREsi, supra note 20, at 40.
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creases the burden on the courts' already crowded dockets. 62 Hence,
market share liability runs afoul of principles of judicial economy
Second, market share liability creates new and umque evidentiary
problems that waste time and energy 163 These new evidentiary prob-
lems will not only further burden the courts, but also will cause the
litigants possibly to spend a considerable and often disproportionate
amount of time and money in relation to the plaintiff's damages.16
a. Market Share Liability and Judicial Costs
Market share theory increases the already crowded court dockets.
Tius result is attributable to two factors. First, market share liability
increases the number of lawsuits filed. Traditionally, an injured
party that could not identify the cause of her injury would not bring
suit because a court would dismiss her claim at the pleading stage. 65
Under market share theory, a plaintiff need join only one manufac-
turer of the injury causing product, and need not establish which,
if any, of the defendants caused the plaintiff's injury 166 Thus, a
greater number of plaintiffs may bring suit. The result most likely
will lead to an explosion of lawsuits involving the injury causing
product. For an example of this problem one need only look to
New York State where close to 600 DES cases are currently pend-
ing. 67
The second reason market share liability increases the court's
burden is that the theory encourages plaintiffs to join a greater
number of defendants. Traditionally, plaintiffs join only the defen-
dant or defendants that the plaintiff identifies as the injury causing
party or parties.'1 Under Sindell, however, a plaintiff must join a
substantial share of the product market. 69 Consequently, a plaintiff
may initially join several hundred defendants to ensure that she has
'" See Freudenhiem, supra note 134, at 19 col. 2 (citing over 1,200 DES cases nationwide,
and 600 in New York alone, with plaintiffs seeking $3 billion in damages).
361 See infra notes 174-88 and accompanying text.
36 Cf. Gilgoff, The DES Daughters Get Day m Court, Newsday, May 1, 1989, § G 4
(Business), at 1 (noting industry costs for DES litigation are $67 million, while in the case of
individual attorney intervewed, only four out of the 105 DES cases he handles involve cancer).
16 Gray v. United States, 445 F Supp. 337 (S.D. Tex. 1978).
366 See, e.g., Martin, 689 P.2d at 382.
6I Freudenhiem, supra note 134, at 19, col. 2.
"6 See, e.g., Payton v. Abbott Laboratories, 437 N.E.2d 171, 188 (Mass. 1982) (noting
that identification of responsible defendant is long standing prerequisite to liability for negli-
gence).
161 Sindell, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145.
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named a sufficient percentage of the product market. 170 As a result,
market share liability induces larger, more complex litigation poten-
tially involving hundreds of defendants,17 1 over several states, who
may no longer do business in the product industry, and who may
no longer even exist m the same corporate form. 72 All of these
factors serve to make market share liability a cumbersome and
awkward theory for courts to apply 173
b. Market Share Liability and Litigation Costs
Not only will market share liability increase judicial costs, but
it also will increase litigation costs. Evidentiary problems under the
market share theory account for most of the new costs. Three
principal reasons exist for the increase in evidentiary problems with
attendant higher costs.
First, market share liability shifts the burden of defendant iden-
tification from the plaintiff to the defendant. 174 The theory makes
this shift without any inquiry into whether the plaintiff or defendant,
in an individual case, is in a better position to present evidence
linking a specific manufacturer with the injury causing product. 175
In some cases, a plaintiff exercising due diligence' 76 actually may be
in the better position, and may incur a lesser cost of identifying the
injury causing defendant.1 7 Even in those cases where no party
stands in a position to identify the correct defendant easily, the
problems and costs of locating documentary evidence 71 that would
link a specific manufacturer to the plaintiff's injury are multiplied
because numerous manufacturers may duplicate discovery efforts.
110 See Smith, 560 N.E.2d at 326 (here, plaintiff named 138 companies as defendants
instead of naming the one company that caused her injury).
7 Id.
,7 Of the 138 companies Sandra Smith named as defendants, only 20 remained after the
trial court granted motions to dismiss on grounds of change in corporate ownership and
jurisdiction. Id. at 326.
173 See Fischer, supra note 27, at 1642 (concluding that market share liability is ineffective
because of practical and procedural difficulties).
174 See, e.g., Sindell, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145 (premsing liability on market
share and not on plaintiff's showing that defendant caused injury).
"I Fischer, supra note 27, at 1649-50.
271 Id. at 1650. For a more complete discussion of a suggested due diligence standard
and its application to market share liability, see Comment, Due Diligence Requirement, supra
note 65.
'7 Fischer, supra note 27, at 1650.
171 For example, manufacturers will have to attempt to locate the records of pharmaceu-
tical wholesalers, retailers, physicians, and pharmacies to track the sale of its product to the
plaintiff. Id.
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Second, the litigants' costs will increase because the market share
theory imposes upon both the plaintiff and defendant the duplicative
burden of establishing the relevant product market. The plaintiff
must show that she has joined a substantial share of either the
national, regional or local product market, 179 depending on the
applicable version of market share liability Hence, the plaintiff
bears the evidentiary burden of uncovering facts that establish the
relevant market and proving that the named defendants represent a
substantial share of that market. 180
To exculpate themselves under the market share theory, defen-
dants must present evidence tending to establish that they did not
market or sell the product in the plaintiff's applicable geographic
region.'8 Consequently, both the plaintiff and defendant bear the
burden of presenting evidence that establishes a relevant geographic
market. 8 2 The costs incurred under this duplicative evidentiary bur-
den are compounded by the long time gap between the sale of the
product and the plaintiff's injury 183 Records concerning the relevant
sales and distribution of the product in a particular market are
usually unavailable, leaving the parties to piece the product market
together through the burdensome process of combining witness
testimony'&4 and the business records of intermediary compames. 18
A final, similar problem presents itself as defendants seek to
establish their actual market share. Market share liability requires
the defendant to establish its actual market share, in a particular
geographic market, to avoid an assumed and potentially larger per-
centage of the product market.'86 Many laws, however, require drug
manufacturers to maintain sales records for only five years.18 The
problem of insufficient or nonexistent records also inhibits proof of
market percentage because it takes so long for the plaintiff's injury
to manifest itself. Consequently, market share theory increases liti-
'11 See, e.g., Sindell, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145 (holding that plaintiff must
name a substantial share of undetermined geographic market).
"8 See George v. Parke-Davis, 733 P.2d 507 (Wash. 1987) (holding that plaintiff must
allege that the manufacturer does business in the relevant local market).
i' Id.
In Id.
"' Comment, Enterprise Liability, supra note 20, at 972.
1,4 For example, the defendant might utilize the testimony of sales persons, doctors,
nurses, or pharmacists.
"5 See supra note 178 for an example of available documentary evidence.
Martin, 689 P.2d at 382-83.
See Smith, 560 N.E.2d at 329; see also MICH. Comp. LAW § 333.17752 (1980) (requirmng
that prescription records be maintained for only five years).
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gation costs as it embroils the parties in duplicative and costly
discovery efforts in order to answer the evidentiary issues pre-
sented. 8
4. Economics and Market Share Liability
Market share liability fails to meet the economic goal of effi-
ciency The theory does not promote safer conduct. In fact, market
share liability offers incentive for manufacturers not to improve
product safety, and not to develop new products that would benefit
the health and safety of the general public.189 Further, the theory
reduces secondary costs m a distorted manner by causing manufac-
turers to spread the costs for liability of a defective product onto
consumers of nondefective and safe products. 19° Consequently, the
market share theory spreads secondary costs in a fashion unrelated
to the actual market influences of a dangerous product.' 9' Finally,
market share liability dramatically increases the admmstrative costs
to both courts and litigants. 92 The increase in admstrative costs
is particularly unjustifiable in cases where a defective product causes
only minor, short term illnesses.193 To summarize, the economic
costs of market share liability outweigh the theory's benefits.
Part II of this Article has shown that market share liability fails
to meet the underlying policy rationale of either a moral or economuc
analysis of tort law The theory does not promote principles of
equity and justice.' 94 Additionally, the theory does not promote the
economic goal of efficiency. 9 The next section of this Article applies
the same policy analysis to the Smith v. Eli Lilly & Co. decision,
and concludes that the Illinois Supreme Court correctly rejected
market share liability for reasons of moral and economic policy
III. A PoLIcy ANALYSIS OF SMmI v Eu LLLy & Co.
In Smith, Sandra Smith brought a products liability action seek-
ing recovery for injuries received from her in utero exposure to
In Fischer, supra note 27, at 1648-50.
See supra notes 125-42 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 155-61 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 152-54 and accompanying text.
I See supra notes 162-88 and accompanying text.
"' See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
194 For a moral analysis of market share liability, see supra notes 100-09 and accompa-
nying text.
I" For an econormc analysis of market share liability, see supra notes 119-88 and
accompanying text.
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DES. 19 The plaintiff originally named 138 drug companies as de-
fendants.i 97 The trial court dismissed 118 of those defendants on
jurisdictional, change of corporate ownership, or misidentification
grounds. 9 ' Twelve of the remaining defendants were able to excul-
pate themselves by proving that they did not manufacture the injury
causing product in the dosage, color, or type the plaintiff's mother
ingested.' 99 Eight defendants"° remained in the case when the trial
court decided to sustain a count of the plaintiff's complaint based
upon a Sindell version of market share liability.2°1 The Illinois Ap-
pellate Court affirmed the trial court's decision, 2 although it adopted
a theory similar to that articulated by the Washington Supreme
Court in Martin v Abbott Laboratores.203 The decision set the stage
for the Illinois Supreme Court to deternune whether to adopt market
share liability, and if so, in what form.
As this Article shows, market share liability is essentially a
policy-based decision to ease the plaintiff's burden of establishing
the cause-in-fact element of her claim.2 The Illinois Supreme Court
also viewed market share liability as a policy-based rule.205 The Smith
court's analysis explores the policy justifications for market share
liability and concludes that the theory fails to advance its alleged
goals.2 The court's opinion is not divided into separate and distinct
discussions of the moral and economic approaches to tort law The
following discussion shows, however, that the Smith court was not
only cognizant of moral and economic policies, but specifically
appealed to each of these policies in its decision to reject market
share liability 0
"1 Smith v. Eli Lilly & Co., 560 N.E.2d 324, 326 (InI. 1990).
19 Id.
' Id.
'9 Fourteen defendants filed summary judgment motions, of wlch the court granted
twelve. Id.
"I The remaining defendants included Abbott Laboratories, Eli Lilly & Company, Premo
Pharmaceutical Laboratories, Inc., Carroll Dunham Smith Pharmacal Company, William H.
Rorer, Inc., S.E. Massengill Company, Harvey Laboratories, Inc., and Boyle & Company.
Id. at 326-27.
201 Id. at 327.
2 Smith v. Eli Lilly & Co., 527 N.E.2d 333, 339 (I1. App. Ct. 1988), rev'd, 560 N.E.2d
324 (Ill. 1990).
= Id.
2' See, e.g., Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 607 P.2d 924, 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 144
(1980) ("[A]s between an innocent plaintiff and negligent defendants, the latter should bear
the cost of the injury."), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).
-" Smith, 560 N.E.2d at 329.
20 See mfra notes 208-59 and accompanying text.
1w For a discussion of the Smith court's moralist analysis, see infra notes 215-27 and
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The Illinois Supreme Court began its analysis by examining the
fundamental substantive principles of tort law The court explained
that in negligence cases, as well as in strict products liability actions,
tort law requires a factual causal connection between the defendant's
conduct and the plaintiff's damage.3 9 The court also noted that the
plaintiff traditionally has the burden of proving that the defendant
caused her injury 210 The Smith court reasoned that causation-m-fact
serves two important functions in tort law 211 Causation-m-fact iden-
tifies the blameworthy party, who must bear the costs of the plain-
tiff's injury.212 Further, causation-m-fact limits potential liability,
thereby avoiding over deterrence that would impede socially bene-
ficial conduct. 213 The Smith court viewed the traditional tort element
of cause-m-fact as promoting both moral and economic policy
goals. 214 A closer examination of the court's decision reveals the
Smith court's reliance on a policy analysis to reject market share
liability
A. The Moralist Policy
Having already outlined the necessity for a plaintiff to prove the
element of cause-in-fact, the Smith decision concluded that market
share liability contravenes fundamental tort principles by imposing
liability on the mere possibility of causation.21- The court explained
that public policy does not favor a plaintiff's recovery over a defen-
accompanying text. For a discussion of the Smith court's economic analysis, see mfra notes
228-59 and accompanying text.
- See Smith, 560 N.E.2d at 328.
See id. ("[The] [c]ausation-m-fact requirement entails a reasonable connection between
the act or omussion of the defendant and the damages which the plaintiff has suffered.").
210 See Id.
211 See id. at 329.
212 Id.
M Id. In so holding, the court stated as follows:
The identification element of causation in fact serves an important function m
tort law. Besides assigning blame-worthiness to culpable parties, it also limits
the scope of potential liability and thereby encourages useful activity that would
otherwise be deterred if there were excessive exposure to liability.
Id.
214 The court recognized that moral goals are served by causation identifying moral
blame, a fundamental prerequisite to liability under the moralist position. R. PoUtrD, supra
note 70, at 79-81. The court also recognized that the causation-m-fact element serves the
economic interests of avoiding over-deterrence, or deterrence of socially beneficial conduct.
See supra notes 122-42 and accompanying text.
215 See Smith, 560 N.E.2d at 333 ("[I]t has been said that this theory contravenes the
fundamental tort principle that a mere possibility is insufficient to satisfy causation.").
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dant's right to require the plaintiff to prove a causal link between
the defendant's conduct and the plaintiff's injury 216 The court's
decision reflects the moralist goal of protecting individual freedom.217
Consistent with the moralist perspective, the Illinois Supreme Court
recognized that causation provides a system of checks and balances
to restrict antisocial behavior while protecting personal autonomy.218
The decision found the mere possibility of causation, which this
Article discusses in terms of probable causation,219 provides an un-
supportable basis for imposing liability on a defendant.2 0 A chief
component in the court's analysis of this point was its recognition
that probable causation leads to an inevitable and unjustifiable
result: "[S]ome defendants wholly innocent of wrongdoing towards
the particular plaintiff will shoulder part or all of the responsibility
for the injury caused."221
In its second appeal to principles of equity and justice, the
Illinois Supreme Court noted that market share liability rewards
those plaintiffs that do not attempt to establish the cause-m-fact
element of their injury, while it punishes plaintiffs that through due
diligence establish a causally responsible but insolvent party.2 Under
the market share liability theory, a plaintiff avoids the risk that the
culpable party may be judgment proof. The court concluded that
the market share theory produces an incentive not to identify, or
even attempt to identify, the defendant that caused the plaintiff's
injury.223 Consequently, market share liability produces the mequi-
table result of removing the plaintiff's burden of establishing the
cause-in-fact element of her claim and subjects potentially innocent
defendants to liability, without any showing that the plaintiff is
unable to identify the culpable partyY4
216 On this point, the court cited the Oklahoma Supreme Court, which explained, "the
public policy favoring recovery on the part of an innocent plaintiff does not justify the
abrogation of the rights of a potential defendant to have a causative link proven between the
defendant's specific tortious acts and the plaintiff's injuries." Smith, 560 N.E.2d at 336 (citing
Case v. Fibreboard Corp., 743 P.2d 1062, 1067 (Okla. 1987)).
217 Cf. R. PouND, supra note 86, at 143.
218 See Smith, 560 N.E.2d at 339-340 (presenting several rationales why removal of the
causation element in market share liability is not warranted).
219 See supra notes 74-75 and 102-09 and accompanying text.
See Smith, 560 N.E.2d at 333, 344-45.
221 Id. at 340.
2 Id. at 338-39.
Id. at 339.
224 The court articulated tus point:
Market share liability also has the potential to treat plaintiffs who cannot identify
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Finally, the Smith court resisted the temptation to impose lia-
bility on a potentially responsible defendant solely because that
defendant has large financial resources.m The court noted that a
defendant's wealth is not a suitable basis for determng liability 226
The decision comports with principles of equity and justice that
predicate liability on injury causing blameworthy conduct and not
on an -individual's ability to pay for an injured party's damage? 27
By choosing the course it did, the court protected individual rights
to personal autonomy and freedom from unfettered judicial retnc-
tions on conduct.
B. The Economist Policy
Although the Smith court did not expressly state that it was
undertaking an economic analysis of market share liability, the court
premised its decision in part on a finding that market share liability
produces inefficient results. In this regard, the court focused on
three economic problems created by the theory First, market share
liability ineffectively deters inefficient conduct and, in fact, may
deter socially beneficial conduct. Next, market share liability spreads
secondary costs in only a limited and ineffective manner. 9 Finally,
the theory produces increased admmstrative costs, both from the
standpoint of the judiciary and of the litigants.230
As already discussed, one of the primary subgoals of an eco-
nomic analysis of the law is to devise a legal system that encourages
socially beneficial conduct, while effectively discouraging inefficient
conduct2 1 The Smith court found that market share liability fails
to meet this subgoal.
the specific manufacturer responsible for the DES maternally ingested more
favorably than one who can. In a typical tort case the plaintiff takes the nsk
that the defendant will be able to assume financial responsibility for injuries
caused. However, with the market share theory, liability is spread throughout
members of the industry, reducing the risk that plaintiff will be without a solvent
defendant. The theory thus pumshes plaintiffs who can satisfy the identification
element, while creating an incentive not to locate the particular manufacturer.
Id. at 338-39.
Id. at 342.
22 See itd. (noting that it is unfair to impose liability solely due to defendant's perceived
wealth or ability to obtain insurance).
See supra notes 106-09 and accompanying text.
= See infra notes 232-44 and accompanying text.
21 See infra notes 246-50 and accompanying text.
2" See infra notes 251-59 and accompanying text.
21 G. CA.L.AnsI, supra note 69, at 28, 73-74.
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The court noted that market share liability, which removes the
defendant identification element from a plaintiff's cause of action,
results in the overdeterrence of manufacturer production.2 32 Similar
to the Payton court, 33 the Smith court predicted that the market
share theory's expansive liability will eventually cripple the entire
pharmaceutical industry's research and development efforts.2 Con-
sequently, the court found that market share liability actually dis-
courages socially beneficial conduct.
On a related point, the Smith court noted that market share
liability fails to discourage inefficient or unsafe conduct effectively.
Initially, the court raised the interesting point that no evidence in
the case established the need for further incentive to produce safer
products in the pharmaceutical industry23 5 In short, the court chal-
lenged the necessity for the additional deterrence that market share
liability provides, in light of the existing deterrence that negligence
and strict product liability laws provide.2 6
Even if more deterrence is necessary, the Illinois Supreme Court
noted that the theory's deterrence is ineffective for two reasons.
Because of the nature of DES injuries, the harm will manifest itself
only a generation after the product is ingested.23 7 Thus, market share
liability does not discourage manufacturers from producing a prod-
uct at the time the product may cause injury 238 The theory seeks to
discourage past conduct retroactively In DES cases, such retroactive
deterrence is unnecessary and has no effect oil the present sale or
marketing of DES, since manufacturers have long since stopped
recommending the drug for use during pregnancy.239
One might argue that market share liability is economically
justifiable because it encourages manufacturers to improve the safety
of their products presently on the marketY0 Market share liability,
however, imposes a broad form of liability on the entire product
Smith, 560 N.E.2d at 341.
23 See supra notes 135-42 and accompanying text.
21 Smith, 560 N.E.2d at 342.
25 Id.
MId.
=7 Id.
m Id.
139 For example, the court noted that in 1971, almost twenty years before the Smith case
was decided, manufacturers stopped selling DES for use dunng pregnancy. Id. at 328.
m See, e.g., Collins v. Eli Lilly Co., 342 N.W.2d 37, 49 (Wis. 1984) (argung that the
cost of damages will act as an incentive for drug companies to test their products adequately
for safety).
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industry 2A1 The Smith court recognized that market share liability
provides no incentive for each manufacturer to improve its particular
product's safety 22 The basis for this opinion was that all manufac-
turers are, in effect, insurers of other manufacturers' products under
the theory 24 Market share liability does not distinguish between
manufacturers, regardless of whether one manufacturer attempts to
improve the safety of its product, while another manufacturer takes
no additional safety measures.2" Instead, the goal of market share
liability is to require the entire industry, rather than a particular
plaintiff, to absorb the cost for an injury245 Therefore, manufac-
turers are left with little or no incentive to improve product safety.
The Smith decision soundly rejects the argument that market
share liability effectively deters inefficient conduct while promoting
socially beneficial conduct. The opinion finds that market share
liability does not support that primary subgoal of the economic
position. The court's economic critique of market share liability,
however, did not stop with a discussion of deterrence.
A second subgoal of the economic position is the effective
spreading of secondary costs.2" The Smith court found that the
market share theory does not effectively and broadly spread second-
ary costs. The court noted that a majority of the product manufac-
turers were not before the court.27 As a result, the plaintiff's damage
was spread among a limited group of compames.m The market
share theory holds the named defendants liable for the plaintiff's
damage that could be attributed to the dozens of manufacturers the
plaintiff has not joined, or for various reasons the court has dis-
missed from the action.2 9 Thus, the Smith court was troubled by
the fact that although market share liability produces some second-
ary cost spreading, it does so in a very limited and ineffective
manner.250
14, See Sindell, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145 (noting that since the plaintiff
need join only a substantial share of product market, any manufacturer may be subject to
liability).
'A Smith, 560 N.E.2d at 342-43.
243 See id.
I" Cf. Spitz, supra note 65, at 632 (pointing out that market share liability does not
consider differences in individual manufacturers' warnings and safety instructions).
7A See supra notes 126-33 and accompanying text.
24 G. CAiABREsi, supra note 69, at 27-28.
Smith, 560 N.E.2d at 344.
248 Id.
29 Id.
20 Id.
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The final subgoal of the economic theory is the reduction of
admimstrative costs. 251 The Smith decision establishes that market
share liability actually increases judicial and litigant costs. The Illi-
nois Supreme Court noted that market share liability will produce
new and unique evidentiary problems, increasing both the monetary
and practical burdens traditional tort litigation already imposes upon
courts and litigants. 22 The court found the theory's requirements
that a plaintiff establish a substantial market share, and that a
defendant prove its actual market percentage, impose an unattain-
able evidentiary burden upon the parties m light of the unreliable
and insufficient data available to resolve these issues .253
Additionally, and as the Smith case's own procedural history
establishes, market share liability increases the number of defendants
and dispositive motions based on jurisdictional, evidentiary, or change
in corporate ownership grounds.54 In Smith, the plaintiff initially
named 138 defendants, seventy of which filed appearances. 255 The
case generated costly motions on several issues filed by both the
plaintiff and defendants .256 The trial court devoted its time and
energy to hearing and resolving many of these motions, even before
the litigants had reached the substantive issues in the case.2 7 If the
case were to proceed to trial, the Smith court cautioned that the
evidentiary problems under market share liability would risk over-
whelming jurors, transforming each trial "into a maxi-trial on a
plethora of issues." 25' The court concluded that the increased ad-
ministrative costs alone may far exceed a defendant's proportionate
share of an eventual judgment. 259 Consequently, the Illinois Supreme
Court maintains that, far from meeting the economic subgoal of
reducing adminstrative costs, market share liability actually increases
such costs.5
21 G. CALABRsi, supra note 69, at 28.
2 Smith, 560 N.E.2d at 337.
21 The Smith court took particular note of the difficulties experienced by California trial
courts in determining definitions of a geographuc market and identifying a substantial share
or a particular defendant's share of the product market. Id. at 337-38.
21 Id. at 326.
23 Id.
2 At least fifty companies filed motions to dismiss and fourteen companies filed sum-
mary judgment motions. Id.
25 For example, the motions to dismiss involved such nonsubstantive questions as juris-
diction, successor liability, and error in identification. Id.
2, Id. at 334.
2" Id. at 338.
m Id.
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The Smith court found that market share liability is a policy
based rule designed to ease a plaintiff's burden of establishing
causation-m-fact.21 Although the court did not expressly articulate
its analysis of this theory in terms of a moral or economic approach
to tort law, the Smith decision appealed to and relied heavily upon
the policy goals inherent m each of those legal theories. Under either
a moral or economc analysis, the Illinois Supreme Court correctly
found that market share liability does not satisfy the fundamental
policy goals of tort law.
Analyzed on an individual level, the decision is lamentable be-
cause some injured victims inevitably will go uncompensated. Ana-
lyzed on a social level, however, the decision benefits the interests
of all persons. It protects individual autonomy, and it encourages
manufacturers to continue to research, develop, market, and sell
drugs that save lives and reduce pain and suffering for millions. To
summarize, the Smith decision produces a result both equitable and
economically efficient. The question remains, however, whether the
Illinois Supreme Court, for similar reasons, will reject the long
standing doctrine of alternative liability when suggested for appli-
cation in pharmaceutical products liability cases.
IV THm NEXT STEP- ALTERNATivE LmmmrrY IN Tm "CiAssic"
SENSE
Prosser and Keeton describe alternative liability as "clearly es-
tablished double fault."'  Alternative liability, like market share
liability, relieves the plaintiff of identifying an actual tortfeasor. 263
The classic example of this theory of liability is Summers v Tice.6 4
In Summers, the plaintiff and two defendants went hunting. 265 The
defendants, apparently armed with identical shotguns, missed their
target, a quail, and struck the plaintiff in ins right eye and face.2m
Several issues were clear beyond doubt: birdshot caused the plain-
tiff's injury, both defendants fired birdshot, the plaintiff was struck
by birdshot fired by one or both of the defendants, and the plaintiff
could not prove which defendant fired the shots that struck the
plaintiff.267
M" See id. at 330 (citing policy rationale articulated by Sindell decision).
' PRossE AND KnatoN, supra note 4, at 271.
Id. at 270-71.
199 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1948).
Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1, 2 (Cal. 1948).
M Id.
-A Id. at 2.
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The court affirmed a negligence judgment against both defen-
dants.3 In its analysis, the court considered the relative position of
the parties and the burden of requiring the plaintiff to establish the
identity of the injury causing defendant. In shifting the plaintiff's
burden, the court relied on the fact that both defendants were
careless toward the plaintiff, and that they collectively brought about
a situation where the negligence of one of them injured the plain-
tiff.269 When faced with an evidentiary burden that the plaintiff
could not overcome, the court reacted with a policy analysis. The
decision forced the defendants to attempt to exculpate themselves,
rather than permitting the plaintiff to remain uncompensated.
Although Summers stretched, and perhaps snapped, the tradi-
tional causation-in-fact element of a cause of action in tort, the
opimon leaves behind certain important principles that one cannot
abandon when determimng whether alternative liability should apply
to pharmaceutical products litigation. First, Summers was a negli-
gence case and, therefore, the court focused on the defendants'
conduct toward the plaintiff.270 The conduct of each defendant was
virtually identical. Second, the type of injury-shotgun wounds-
was undisputed.27' Third, it was clear that the birdshot that struck
the plaintiff was fired from either or both of defendants' shotguns.
In short, the only unknown was which of the two defendants in
fact caused the plaintiff's injunes. 272 Under this narrow, special fact
pattern, the court did not require the plaintiff to identify who caused
the harm.
Pharmaceutical products litigation, unlike traditional negligence
actions, does not typically focus on the conduct of a manufacturer
toward a consumer. Liability is strictly applied and not conditioned
on the plaintiff's showing that the defendant violated a standard of
care.273 Instead, product liability cases typically concern the condition
of a product. 274 Even "failure to warn" pharmaceutical cases gen-
erally do not focus on a manufacturer's duty to warn the consumer,
since the duty to warn runs only to the prescribing physician under
the "learned intermediary rule." 275
2M Id.
20 Id. at 4-5.
m' Id. at 2.
"' Id.
z Id.
7 M. PoLELLE & B. OT-Ey, ILLiNois TORT LAW 555 (1985).
274 Id.
2 See, e.g., Kirk v. Michael Reese Hosp., 513 N.E.2d 387, 394 (Il1. 1987) (duty to warn
extends only to prescribing physician).
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In Senn v. Merrell-Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. ,276 the Supreme
Court of Oregon decried the violence that alternative liability visits
upon the burden of proving factual causation in tort. In Senn, the
plaintiff sued the only two defendants that might have manufactured
the injury causing diphtheria pertussis tetanus vaccine.277 Neverthe-
less, the court held that the plaintiff could not invoke the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts § 433B version of alternative liability 27 18
The court focused on the burden of proof issue and explained
that the application of alternative liability
to a case [in] which neither defendant is able to produce exculpa-
tory evidence is to impose liability where the probability of cau-
sation is 50 percent or less ("as probable as not" or "less than
probable") as opposed to the traditional 50 + percent ("more
probable than not") preponderance of evidence standard and to
impose liability on all defendants when in fact only one of them
could have caused plaintiff's harm.279
The same analysis applies to Illinois law, which requires that a
plaintiff prove each element of a cause of action as "more probably
true than not."
The Senn court's commentary illustrates the basic unfairness of
efforts to impose joint liability without a preponderance of proof
of causation. Not only does alternative liability raise a presumption
of liability with a 50 percent or lower proof of causation, 281 as the
Senn court observed, the theory also falls to explain or justify the
requirement that the defendant prove it has not caused the plaintiff's
harm .22 The court questioned what lesser degree of likelihood other
courts will permit in order for a plaintiff to establish causation, or
a defendant to establish a lack of causation.23 Should that degree
of causation continue to shift with the number of defendants?28 For
26 751 P.2d 215 (Or. 1988).
2" Senn v. Merrell-Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 751 P.2d 215, 216 (Or. 1988).
2 Id. at 222-23.
2 Id. at 222.
21 Reivitz v. Chicago Rapid Transit Co., 158 N.E. 380, 381-82 (111. 1927) (holding that
the plaintiff must prove each element of a cause of action by greater weight or preponderance
of evidence); see also Sutton v. Washington Ruther Parts & Supply Co., 530 N.E.2d 1055,
1058-59 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988) (holding that plaintiff must present evidence beyond mere
possibility that defendant manufactured injury causing product).
Senn, 751 P.2d at 222.
Id. at 223.
"Id.
n4 Id.
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example, in a case where ten defendants are before the court, should
the court impose liability on the defendants when the plaintiff is
unable to prove greater than a ten percent likelihood that each of
the defendants individually caused the injury9 Under alternative
liability, as the number of defendants increases the likelihood that
a particular defendant caused the plaintiff's injury decreases. The
theory not only relieves the plaintiff of proving causation in fact
but also finds defendants liable for damages without a showing that
any particular defendant more likely than not caused the plaintiff's
injury.
Similar to the market share theory, questions of moral and
economc policy would suggest that alternative liability is an unjus-
tifiable and inefficient theory. Alternative liability unduly restricts
an individual's freedom of action without a showing that the defen-
dant's conduct infringed on the rights of another person. 5 The
theory, like market share liability, creates many over deterring
effectsn and increased administrative costs2 because alternative
liability imposes liability without proof of causation and creates new
evidentiary causation problems that will lead to an increased spend-
Ing of judicial and litigant time and resources.
CONCLUSION
This Article explores the variations of market share liability, the
moral and economic theories of tort law, and the application of
these theories to the Smith v Eli Lilly & Co. opinon and alternative
liability At each juncture, the authors conclude that non-identifi-
cation of tortfeasors does not promote the purpose of tort law.
Furthermore, both market share liability and alternative liability are
mconsistent with Illinois products liability law. That certain injured
persons will remain uncompensated is a result that must be tolerated,
for the alternative is the imposition of liability on those that are
truly not culpable.
2" See supra notes 76-88 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 122-42 and accompanying text.
2" See supra notes 162-88 and accompanying text.
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